India’s security-centric policies makes even the simplest of bilateral problems intractable.
On June 29 Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh told 25 print editors that 25 per cent of the Bangladeshi population was anti-Indian—inadvertently triggering a diplomatic crisis in the aftermath. Singh’s comment was meant to be off-the-record, but the whole transcript of the interaction with the editors made it in the public domain after it was published in the PMO website-which was later removed.
“At least 25 per cent of the population of Bangladesh swear by the Jamiat-ul-Islami [sic] and they are very anti-Indian, and they were in the clutches, many times, of the ISI,” Singh said according to reports.
If that is the method by which New Delhi makes its calculation about its friends and enemies, most of the South Asian countries surrounding India would qualify as anti-Indians. By that standard more than a third of Nepali population would be anti-India given that they voted for the Maoists.
The comment from Dr Singh, who is soft-spoken and mild-mannered, came at a time when he is preparing to visit Dhaka. Fortunately Delhi and Dhaka have managed to improve ties considerably since the Awami Leauge government came to power in 2008. But the fact that it was meant to be off-the-record, indicates that the prime minister was aware of the sensitivity and gravity of the “information” he was passing off. Such a comment reflects poorly not only on Indian political leadership’s judgement, but also how its agencies process information strictly in black and white categories.
The problem lies therein. India’s neighbourhood policy is obsessively security-centric and that regularly makes even the simplest of bilateral problems intractable, taking decades to resolve. Of course, not everything India does in its neighbourhood is purely out of security concern and security is not the entire sum of its bilateral relationships. To be fair, it has supported the growth of democratic and pluralistic society in the region. It spends majority of its foreign assistance in the region-often amounting to millions of dollars. Nepal receives billions of rupees every year in bilateral assistance. But the high-handed approach of India’s bureaucrats makes its neighbours uncomfortable and suspicious about the New Delhi’s larger game plan. Some of these issues are a product of unfavourable perception partly shaped by historical and cultural baggage, but certainly India hasn’t done itself a favour by allowing the perception to perpetuate. It is also extra-sensitive to presence of extra-regional powers, especially China and to some extent US and EU countries in what it considers its sphere of influence Why is New Delhi not assured even when Dhaka has a very India-friendly government at the moment? There are many reasons, but primary among them is that its neighbours do not share New Delhi’s security concerns-making them uncooperative. This leads the security agencies to conclude that a country X or party Y is destructive to their interests—an ‘either you are with us or against us’ argument of sorts.
Over the years, India has also failed to develop a security doctrine that is shared by even its neighbours-allowing genuine Indian concerns to be perceived unfavourably as meddling.
Every time the Indians forward a proposal or make demands relating to security, its neighbours get suspicious about its intent. Often, the suspicion manifests itself into strong security dilemma forcing them even to reach out to “extra-regional powers” like China or the US to balance Indian overtures. There cannot be a purely unilateral security approach without the regional ownership of its partners. And no security doctrine is going to succeed on its own. It needs to be integrated in a larger development and economic vision for the region.
New Delhi will have to revamp its public diplomacy in the region-projecting its values and vision for the region, not its fears and insecurities-and coordinating the works of its different agencies-giving it a degree of coherence.
Public resentment is not permanent, and it can be changed with proper set of policies. Take for example, the opinion about America in the Muslim world during the Bush era. After President Barrack Obama assumed the leadership of America, he consciously reached out to the Muslims. In two short years, the public across Arab countries are calling for American help in democratising their country. What George Bush failed with American military might and money, Obama succeed with his quiet diplomacy and sustained public engagement. New Delhi’s public statement on the importance it attaches to its neighbours has not been matched by its action. No Indian prime minister has visited Kathmandu since 1996 on an official visit.
“It appears that there is neither an interest in the neighbourhood nor time for the political class in India to deal with its neighbours, except when it comes to Pakistan,” wrote Smruti S. Pattanaik in his journal article, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Perceptions from Bangladesh,” published earlier this year.
To many, its policies on Nepali or Bangladeshi imports, for example, give away the paradox that India is-a mismatch between its global-power ambition and small-power mindset.
“A resourceful and capable India, therefore, has appeared to the smaller neighbours as a petty trader of economic goods and advantages. India has not been able to earn political goodwill through its economic diplomacy despite the fact that it is the most important economic partner of some of its neighbours and has provided huge assistance and support to them,” SD Muni, an eminent Nepal expert in India, wrote in an article published in 2009.
Lack of coherent and integrated security and development policy makes waste of India’s leverage in the neighbourhood and the resources it pours. Without bringing more coherence to its bilateral dealings, India will forever struggle to make sense of its neighbourhood-making paranoid pronouncements. In turn its neighbours will be left to wonder about New Delhi’s words and deeds-leaving the door ajar for more “extra-regional” players-not less.
India’s security-centric policies makes even the simplest of bilateral problems intractable, taking decades to resolve
Of course, the onus also lies on its neighbours to understand New Delhi better, but as the regional power house with global ambition, India’s responsibilities are greater.
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