Towards a finale

Parties took a critical leap forward on Tuesday, but they will have to be realistic about anticipating the problems in its implementation.

After dithering for over three years, the major parties finally gave what they had promised—a breakthrough in the peace process and a genuine effort to restore the consensus mechanism on statute drafting and power-sharing. This is a landmark agreement and second only to 2005-06 peace framework.

Statistically, it is rare that civil wars result into permanent peace. Out of 140 civil wars around the world since 1945, just over 18 percent have ended in a peaceful settlement. The risk of backsliding into conflict even after initial settlement is high. But Tuesday’s agreement is another assurance that Nepal’s peace process is in different league altogether and has developed a level of resilience that is difficult to undo.

It has also shown that Nepali political actors understand risk of another conflict and are capable acting rationally when it matters.

Integrating and rehabilitating Maoist combatants is a critical component of Nepal’s negotiated settlement, but examples from elsewhere shows that implementing a Military Integration (MI) agreement isn’t always easy. According to dataset put together by Doyle and Sambanis between 1945 and 1999, 27 wars ended in negotiated settlement and MI took place in 34 cases. Out of 34, only 23 were actually implemented.

Many integration agreements fail to take off or fail midway because of irreconcilable differences aided by calculations among warring sides that returning to conflict is less costly than permanent peace. But in Nepal, thankfully, the settlement process has come to a point where the cost of returning to conflict far outweighs the cost of peace.

The deal has now opened doors for tangible progress on peace, statute-writing and power-sharing, and its implementation will complete the Nepal’s five-years-old arduous peace journey.

The deal appears to be win-win situation for both the Maoists and non-Maoist parties. On ranks and modality, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML managed to get what they wanted. On numbers and rehabilitation package, the Maoists managed to strike a rather sweet deal. The agreement is bit ambiguous on rank and leadership issue of the new directorate but it is possible that the parties have a gentlemen’s agreement behind the actual agreement, and that the ambiguity on ranks and leadership were deliberate.

Both sides in the negotiation pro-cess have constituency to keep, and the deal has enough to keep even the extr-eme elements on both sides engaged.

Maoists hardliners have been insisting all along that the leadership of the directorate be given to PLA combatants. On number and financial package, the hardliners do not have much to complain about. Although Mohan Baidya and company were publicly calling for 8,000 combatants to be integrated, they had more or less accepted that it won’t exceed 7,000 — the number proposed officially by the party establishment. By agreeing on a generous rehabilitation package, NC and UML have deliberately given Dahal room for some face-saving with the hardliners. In return the Maoists have agreed to return seized properties and provide compensation to the owners. Though the tab will be picked by the taxpayers, the price for peace is far less than the cost of continued stalemate.

The give-and-take also indicates the growing rapport between parties and how far both sides have gone to accommodate each other’s concern. This should all work out well for Dahal

in undermining the hardliners’ case. Reports from Maoists cantonments

suggest that Dahal may have pulled

this one off very well .

Integration is a big issue for rebels anywhere after a negotiated settlement for two primary reasons: security guarantee by being part of state’s coercive apparatus and financial incentives. In Nepal the political landscape is such that the former rebels have no need for the security guarantees that comes with integration. The Maoists are part

of the state establishment as an unintended consequence of the political expediency at the time. Nepali actors didn’t follow the typical sequencing of a peaceful settlement: demobilisation, disarmament and elections. Election before the management of arms catapulted the rebels as the largest political party in the CA—dramatically altering the political equations. This has also eliminated the possibility of state reneging on its integration promise or giving a raw deal to the rebels, although the thought must have crossed minds of non-Maoists politicians.

The morphing of former rebels into state actors before the integration started leaves little need for security guarantees. Therefore, it shouldn’t surprise people if generous financial package end up attracting more ex-PLA men than the Maoists had intended.

Overall, Nepal Army deserves credit for thinking outside the box and floating the original proposal that became the basis for Tuesday’s agreement. But there are still many unanswered questions. The deal only provides a broad outline of an integration process and seems to make false assumption that process will be smooth. For it to work the agreement will have to be properly structured. The fixing of the top ceiling for integration, though a political necessity, contradicts the principle of voluntary integration and retirement. What if, hypothetically, more people than expected express wish for integration and also pass the norms of the NA? The current deal assumes that the Maoists will be able to persuade them to change their minds. The Maoists have already finished their version of ‘expression of interest’ survey and the number on the deal is comfortably within the rang. Experiences from sub-Saharan Africa, however, suggests otherwise. Too many simplistic assumptions about a process as complex as integration leads to a poorly worked out integration process that risks failure. Although in Nepal, the transformation of Maoists into a mainstream political force is a guarantor against that risk.

Integration can be a messy process, and working out tight time-bound calendar, though a political necessity, appears unrealistic.

Another significant issue which the parties need to pay attention to is the dispute resolution mechanism. At some point there is bound to be grievances, especially from the former rebels, about real or imagined discrimination. The ex-PLA could find the disciplinary regime of a national army unfair and may feel that they are being discriminated against. Parties and the Special Committee, therefore, should look into forming a separate tribunal to address these issues. Absence of such a tribunal could tempt the Maoists to meddle in favour of their comrades, especially if they are in a position of power.

NC shifts strategy to counter ‘misperception’

KATHMANDU, NOV 01 - A series of positive statements on the peace process in the past one month reflects a tactical shift in negotiation and public relations (PR) strategy adopted by the Nepali Congress, which, the party leaders hope will counter the party's 'obstructionist image.'

The new approach stems largely from conviction among the NC leaders that a generally positive approach in public presentation on matters related to the peace and statute drafting processes will help claw back the party's 'unfavourable' image.

NC leaders say they have now realised that the Maoists have all along handled themselves extremely well before the media, when in fact they were pushing for tough bargain in the actual negotiations. This has led to the grand old party, which prides itself in leading the charge in 'numerous democratic struggle', being presented in negative light.

"We will be extremely amenable to fulfil the public aspirations for peace and constitution," said NC President Sushil Koirala, speaking briefly at the Maoist tea reception in Kathmandu on Monday--hours after attending negotiations among the three major parties.

The remarks are part of NC's careful strategy to get the public messaging right in a bid to avoid being seen as a 'status-quoist,' according to NC leaders.

"We are very serious about completing the peace process," said NC leader and a member of the Special Committee, Minendra Rijal. "But we haven't done enough to present ourselves favourably in the press. So we thought this is the right time to be proactive."

The new efforts come amid a growing perception that the Maoists were doing more to complete the peace process despite strong opposition from hardliners among them. This has earned the former rebels some accolades among the international community--especially after the Maoists handed over the keys to arms containers on September 1.

"In our meetings we have been telling NC leaders to be more amenable," said a Western diplomat last month.

A February 2009 US embassy cable dispatched from Kathmandu on the eve of US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher's visit to Kathmandu also sheds some light on how the NC was perceived even among countries that had been critical of the Maoists in the past.

"The GON (Government of Nepal) has made little progress on the wider peace process, and bickering within and among the political parties has not helped matters. The opposition NC party complains about the Maoists' lack of implementation of previous agreements, especially returning seized land and reigning in the YCL, and other parties even within the ruling coalition share the complaints. Nevertheless, the NC tends to appear as obstructionist more often than not."

NC leaders say that they are aware of these perceptions and that they are now doing more to counter it.

"Our public presentation of the peace process has been flawed for quite sometime," admitted NC leader Gagan Thapa, who along with others, has advised the party leadership to do away with "too much negativity" in public remarks. "It has done quite a lot of damage to our public standing."

NC President Sushil Koirala is said to be convinced that adopting a 'non-obstructionist' approach on the peace process coupled with an increase in engagement with the Maoists will ultimately help the NC's image. A semblance of progress in the peace process also provides a useful diversion from NC's internal problem for Koirala who is under strong pressure from the Deuba camp for unilaterally dissolving the party's sister wings.

However, NC leaders make clear that the positive vibes in the media, in part, come as a reciprocation of the Maoist gesture rather than a 'unilateral action.'

The party president's point-man on the peace process, Krishna Sitaula, argues that it is the 'change of heart,' among the Maoists, particularly Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai that drives his party's response.

Even party President Sushil Koirala feels that Dahal and Bhattarai will have to be encouraged to take the peace process forward. Koirala has publicly prodded Dahal to act as a statesman and take risks to take the peace process forward. If the peace process is concluded, NC, too, gets the credit, and if polarisation within the Maoists leads to a split within them, the party benefits equally, goes the thinking, according to some NC leaders.

"If you look at the negotiations, there hasn't been any substantive change in our positions," said NC leader Rijal. "Maoists say they are serious about completing the peace process. Even if it's their bluff, it is high time we call their bluff."

The last leg

In a nutshell, there is one fundamental disagreement on integration: whether or not the combatants should be allowed to retain a distinct identity. Nepali Congress fears that doing so, even after integration, will continue to ‘fan fire to smoulders’ of the conflict. The NC argument is that the Maoists could use their former fighters for ulterior motives if they are somehow allowed to cling on to old loyalties. NC leaders have recently cited examples of mutiny from Bangladesh in support of their argument. It is not yet clear if the Maoists leadership have given up their demand of retaining a separate identity for the combatants, but for sure, the hardliners want it more than anything. Some NC leaders however seem to think that the Maoist establishment is willing to let go of the demand.

Nepal’s peace process has shown surprising resilience over the years. It has survived the breakdown of the consensus prevalent after the Constituent Assembly election of 2008; it survived the sharp polarisation between parties from May 2009 to early 2011 that threatened to derail the peace framework; and it also survived the abrupt departure of UNMIN. Over the course of the peace process, both sides have reneged on their word, partly due to intra-party complications and partly for political expediency. But as the stalemate protracted, both sides have made a surprising turnaround to find common ground by starting where they left off in 2008. In many ways, smooth progress until the CA election and turbulence thereafter was natural. In the initial days of the peace process, the parties had to deal with the broader contours of the process and had a common enemy in the form of the monarchy. But as the enemy was eliminated and time progressed, agreement on specificities could no longer be deferred. Both

sides then took to differing interpretations of what those contours meant to appease their own constituencies.

Once again, parties have reached a broad understanding to expedite the integration process and neither side is deliberately using contentious issues to defer an agreement. The Maoists have shown greater flexibility on some of their demands. Equally, the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML are determined to see this through and have hence have shown flexibility of their own. The biggest catalyst has been the clarity shown by the Maoists on how far they are willing to go to resolve the issues, despite opposition from hardliners within them. In turn, NC leaders have increasingly begun to articulate, in clearer and amenable terms, where their core objections lie and where they are willing to cede ground. This has reduced the trust deficit among both sides. But a more instrumental role in nudging all parties has been played quietly by India. There is a growing sense that India, once again, is taking some ownership of the peace process that it originally facilitated.

India will have to be given a formal public role and Prime Minister Bhattarai rightly reiterated his official request in New Delhi, as he did in New York. So many other international actors with little contributions in facilitating the initial peace framework are actively contributing in various aspects of the process. It is only appropriate that New Delhi, whose behind the scene role has been instrumental from the get-go, be given a public role. But spreading the ownership of the peace process among other domestic constituents is equally critical in guaranteeing success as Nepal’s key actors embark on the last leg of this long and arduous peace journey.

Potential spoilers

There is a constituency in all three major parties that opposes further compromises. In the Maoists, it is quite obvious—the hardliners are more organised and influential than ever before as they vigorously pursue the formation of parallel structures. That gives them an enormous ability to undercut the support for a deal with the Maoists rank and file. Prachanda will have to work overtime on his persuasion skills, but more importantly, giving them an ownership in the decision-making process will go a long way. Only Dev Gurung has been continuously involved in the peace process from this camp. Despite his posturing, Gurung is the only one who understands the complications and the nuances of the peace process. Others have been largely shut out from engagement with other parties. Most of them were in jails in India when the process started, but later

the party headquarters deliberately gave them no role. That needs to change if Dahal wants to avoid an all out assault from the Baidya camp.

In the Nepali Congress, there is also a segment that is opposed to giving up on the party’s long-held stance. In fact, some leaders close to the party establishment are in favour of inking a deal and joining the current government. The opposition within Nepali Congress is partly opportunistic—jockeying for the party’s internal power-sharing—and partly fanned by the conservative element within it that has never accepted the 2005/06 peace framework. Sushil Koirala, like Prachanda, will have to reach out to his opponents.

Support or opposition to further compromises that could lead to a final resolution also depends on how far and

wide the ownership of the peae process is spread and on calculations of who stands to gain or lose in next elections. The three parties will have to keep up the tempo of current engagement, while addressing each other’s sensitivities.