UN bodies should stay

UN bodies' untimely exit will make the peace process more susceptible to manipulation and will increase China and India's opaque influence

At a time when the crisis of confidence between the parties in the peace process has taken a serious blow, not least due to the demise of Girija Prasad Koirala and by the intentional ratcheting up the conflict on many fronts, the term of two UN bodies is coming to an end. The mandates of the UN’s political mission, UNMIN, and the UN’s human rights agency, OHCHR, expire on May 15 and June 9 respectively. Whatever the argument against them may be, the argument for their continuing presence is compelling for one simple reason: if nothing else, they provide a framework for a veneer of trust and confidence for both sides (the Maoists and the state) to operate. Despite the Maoists’ rhetoric and even threats to return to violence, they know that they cannot do so without massive provocation. Even on the side of the state, the army is equally beholden to its commitment, however reluctant it may seem to fulfil its end of the bargain. The presence of UNMIN, symbolic as it may be, is a guarantee against incidents like the Doromba massacre from ever recurring. At least, that is the idea.

Both sides have plenty to dislike about UNMIN and OHCHR, primarily because they perform a thankless job and are not doing either party’s bidding. So when UNMIN stuck to the letter and spirit of the Agreement on Monitoring and Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) and refused to divulge details about combatants (something that was in the Maoists’ favour by default), the government and its media operatives began a smear campaign. Now the government is even trying to terminate their mandate that is up for renewal

Nitpicky neighbours

There is more to the government’s reluctance than just the disenchantment of the ruling coalition. Nepal’s two giant neighbours are railing against it. China fears both UN bodies will make a foray into its underbelly, the Tibetan issue. India also has qualms about UNMIN limiting its role, and fears that the intention of OHCHR Nepal office to ‘oversee’ South Asia will bring in unnecessary meddling into its own rights issues — causing embarrassment on the international stage — especially its right record will be up for Universal Periodic Review in 2012. Both neighbours who claim to look out for Nepal’s best interest seem willing to push Nepal up against the wall when their own perceived interests are at stake. If India wants to play a role commensurate with its influence in Nepal’s peace process, why is it then shying away from declaring it formally? Why hasn’t New Delhi even appointed a special envoy? Why has it been left to unaccountable intelligence operatives and bureaucrats?

New Delhi needs to come clean on what it wants. It is unbecoming for a big democratic power like India to continue to conduct its affairs in stealth and secrecy in the neighbourhood. What makes Nepalis suspicious of India is the clandestine nature with which it exercises its influence in Nepal. This is not to disparage the importance of India to Nepal: It has been an ardent supporter of our democratic aspirations and millions of Nepalis eke out a living from jobs throughout India. But its good deeds are overshadowed by its reliance on shadowy intelligence figures and clumsy and piecemeal handling of crisis in Nepal. That’s where they differ from the Chinese.

If India wants to play a role in Nepal in proportion to its influence and new found global position, it needs to shed the colonial hangover of its bureaucracy and exercise its influence at the level of its political leadership. It should also have the courage to wield its influence formally and transparently. That’s a decision India has to make.

But Nepal government’s reluctance to extend the stay of UNMIN and OHCHR is self-defeating and myopic. If the government can’t resist neighbourly pressure now on issues that are important for the country, it will have to forever cave into that kind of hounding. It will set a precedent that future governments will find hard to overcome. It is vital that both UNMIN and OHCHR stay until the peace process is completed and a semblance of normalcy returns. The idea that UNMIN should pack its bags the day the issue of army integration is resolved is rash and inconsiderate of the contingencies that are a normal part of any peace process. The idea that the peace process would somehow lend itself to a speedy conclusion is too optimistic to be true. The progress so far is indicative that assumptions about quick resolutions are unrealistic. As for the fate of OHCHR, lobbying from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has partly played out against its extension. Office bearers in the NHRC are getting unnecessarily territorial. All the efforts the NHRC has made so far suggests that it is a work-in-progress, at best.

Smear campaign?

A section of UML-leaning intelligentsia has been trying to mitigate blame of the government by misdirecting it on UN bodies (the shortcomings of the UN agencies is topic for another discussion). First the diarrheal epidemic in Jajarkot was blamed on bad rice delivered by the WFP; the NHRC and INSEC’s grudge against OHCHR has been building up for quite some time; and now the gun has been trained on UNMIN for its ‘pro-Maoist bias.’ It hardly seems to be a coincidence that these allegations are coming mostly from those affiliated to UML in some way. It also seems rather convenient that it all started with the formation of the Madhav Nepal-led government.

Like Afghan President Hamid Karzai blaming the UN and the European Commission for orchestrating the electoral fraud in last August’s presidential elections in Afghanistan, these allegations in Nepal also have a familiar ring to them — they are survival tricks of a desperate government propped up by the self-serving political elite. One can only hope that the situation won’t deteriorate further. The only deterrene that stands between the current situation and full scale escalation of conflict is the presence UN bodies and the international community. It is also the only deterrence that stands in the way of more opaque and hence unaccountable involvement of the neighbours. Those who point to the UN’s failure elsewhere as an argument for UNMIN’s early exit would do well to remember that it is ultimately up to the political leadership in Nepal and that the UN’s presence in itself is no guarantee of success. The least it does is assure that the trust gap between the parties would not lead to renewal of large scale violence.

But it is also the responsibility of the international community not to be discouraged by partisan quarreling or sucked into it — and to make sure that the UN’s political presence continues uninterrupted in Nepal as long as the peace process isn’t complete.

All those years ago

The Kathmandu Post
Feb 24 - In January 2008, I was in Narsingh VDC in Sunsari district, a predominantly Madhesi area, on a reporting assignment. I was forced into an argument with a group of locals about the mistreatment of Madhesis by the state. As the discussion progressed, a teacher raised a point about my job that forced me to think. She said that the fact that a Pahade had come to report from Madhes was evidence in itself of the continuing domination of Madhesis by others. Was I guilty?

That encounter shook me up a bit; but the incident also revealed the level of animosity between the two communities and its misdirection. I managed to convince them that I as an individual could not account for their suffering though I condemn any mistreatment, and that only the state could answer their charges; and that as a journalist, I was doing something to get their views across. Though legitimate, their grievances and anger were clearly misaimed.

Does the fact that the ruling elite had been dominated by Pahades/Chhetris/ Brahmins — which nevertheless also included the elite from other communities including Madhesis — in the last 30 years justify painting all Pahades with the same brush? Of course, any sensible person will disapprove of it. But like any other society passing through a phase of half-boiled revolution and transformation, a sense of historical right and wrong is among the preoccupations of certain sections in Nepal. And in times of crisis, expediency, not factualness, drives these considerations. Like all re-readings of history, one can’t escape from the inherent flaws associated with the process for it takes place entirely to justify or condemn the larger political process.

Prithvi Narayan Shah and his conquests have been a subject of much debate in the last few years. Many have condemned him and his acts, while others still see him as one of the few visionaries modern Nepal ever had. It is not surprising that Shah’s inadequacies are glossed over in the history books. All history is embellished or distorted, and no historical figure can withstand critical scrutiny for that matter.

Friedrich Nietzsche, writing in his essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, said that an excess of history was harmful, and that it prevents a man, nation or culture from acting “unhistorically” — meaning without the past in the mind. Such an acute sense of history shackles a nation and does not make it free. He identifies three types of history: monumental, antiquarian and critical.

The monumental approach is preferred by the powerful and men of actions who see no peers in contemporary society and instead look back to the past for comfort and guidance. Even the past suffers at the hands of monumental historians. Sections of the past are wilfully forgotten or ignored, whereas a few selective facts and individuals “rise out like islands”. The antiquarian approach reveres and strives to preserve the past; it looks more at the past and its glory than towards the future. The critical approach judges and condemns the injustice and the cruelty of the past, but also upholds what is right. It is not a sweeping condemnation.

Nietzsche argued that each of these approaches may be appropriate depending on the “soil and climate”. But he cautioned that excess indulgence or lack of clarity of purpose was always dangerous, “A critic without the need for the criticism, the antiquarian without the piety for the past, or the man who recognises the greatness of the past but himself cannot accomplish any greatness.”

It is easy to make sweeping statements (good or bad) about the past; it is still easier to condemn and crucify historical figures, but that doesn’t undo the past, nor does it make it right. We cannot force our modern sensibilities on the past. It is one thing to use history for a context and completely another to attempt to rewrite it. I think it is tempting to disown the past entirely and rewrite it according to the mood of the time. But how does that make us any different from the historians of the past who wrote the history to suit the winners of the time? A critical reading of history is desirable as long as it is not motivated by vengeance. A wholesale rejection of our “monumental” history suffers from the same folly as wholesale acceptance.

People who indulge too much in the past without the need are merely trying to find an excuse for their present failures. These are not ordinary people who have to slog day in and day out for mere sustenance, but rather demagogues, moral and ethnic entrepreneurs who lack solutions and instead create problems. Many of our “revolutionaries” who tried to strip the country of its past in a zeal of corrective vengeance by demolishing many statues around the country should hear this piece of admonishment from the original republicans and revolutionaries in the modern sense.

During the French Revolution, a tide of popular iconoclasm had swept the country that led to the destruction of works of art that were associated with the monarchy. In his address to the revolution’s foot soldiers and vandals, Abbe Gregoire, a prominent member of the revolution’s Committee of Public Instruction, made his case clear in a rhetorical question: “Because the pyramids of Egypt had been built by tyranny and for tyranny, ought these monuments of antiquity be demolished?”

Should we let the tyranny of Nepal’s past make its present equally tyrannical? Or should we learn from the past’s tyranny to not repeat it? Whether we choose to use history in the right vein or abuse it for short-term political expediency will determine how the present is judged by the future, and more importantly whether we remain shackled to the past or move forward into the future. Prof. Mahendra Lawoti, in his article (“It ain’t so,” Feb. 19, Page 6) suggested that an apology would begin the “healing process”. But I wonder who it should come from.

john.parajuli@gmail.com

Himalayan howler

The climate debate has exposed the entangled link between press, politics and science
The Kathmandu Post
John Narayan Parajuli
FEB 14 -
The Nepali cabinet meeting at Everest base camp in December last year may have helped to highlight the effects of climate change in the Himalaya in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, but the revelation of a serious omission in the projection by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has set in motion a debate that is likely to undermine the very basis of climate claim in the region. Facts on the ground notwithstanding, such high profile “crying wolf” about the intensity of the process is likely to weaken even realistic claims about the region. Add to that Indian Environment Minister Jayaram Ramesh’s hard line against melting glaciers in the Himalaya or cutting carbon emissions by India.

It is understandable that India, like China, does not want to commit itself to a target that would jeopardise its own growth, but it is myopia of Himalayan proportions not to take into account a cost-benefit analysis of the long-term environmental impact. There is clearly a divide even among the developing countries. Those that are rapidly developing and industrialising do not want to give up their “right” to burn more fossil fuels on their path to prosperity. Those who are downright poor and have no greater prospects for an industrial revolution and are at the worst receiving end of climate change are clamouring for action. But who is listening besides, of course, the lip service and unbinding commitments?

A glance at the geopolitics of negotiating international environmental negotiations on climate change at the Copenhagen Summit draws attention to the tricky issues of international political economy — different North-South priorities and responsibilities, as well as different levels of susceptibility to climate change. Poorer countries are much more vulnerable than richer countries; logically they want prosperous countries to cushion the effects for them. But the overriding assumption at the Copenhagen Summit was that science as an international enterprise is a neutral process aloof from political and social underpinnings of the environment it operates within. But the work of Golinski and others indicate that even the very “hardest” strain of science is not free from social relations.

Prof. David Demeritt of King’s College London, in a journal article in 2001 entitled “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, said. “[T]o insist, therefore, that science is also political, in the broadest sense of that word, is not to say that science is only political and thereby collapse entirely the distinction between the two. It is to recognise how problematic this distinction is. The social relations that science involves necessarily influence both the character of scientific understandings upstream and the particular political outcomes that may result from them downstream in legislation or administrative law rulings.”

The extent of ideological closure on issues on both sides of the climate change divide (anthropogenic/natural or happening/hoax) in the global North, and between the countries in the North and the South, is now becoming more apparent. The IPCC’s cavalier sourcing of WWF’s erroneously published report on Himalayan glaciers combined with the e-mail scandal from the University of East Anglia has emboldened the critics so much so that the British minister responsible for climate was forced to declare war against the climate change sceptics. It almost sounds like some politicians need climate change to be happening to grind their own axe.

Is this unravelling simply a human error or is it more human than researchers would like to admit? What does this tell us about the gung-ho climate change believers (including East Anglia scientists who have shied away from being transparent about the process by which they drew their conclusions) or the gung-ho sceptics? Can we say for sure that their work is entirely apolitical, and that they are not driven by some ideological considerations? For example, the belief that the climate is changing, hence it must be proven by any means. Or it is a left-liberal conspiracy, and that all the facts are cooked. And how does the media fare, where a contest for the hearts and minds of the public is raging?

The answer to these questions is not easily forthcoming. But the debate on climate change has highlighted how entangled the relationship is between the press, politics and science; and how different perceptions are formed from the same facts. Different interpretations of scientific facts have either belittled or exaggerated the science behind environmental degradation; both extremes are risky because it foments either complacency or panic among the public and the policy makers. Politicians and interest groups have hijacked the scientific agenda. For better or worse, the scientific claims have now become part of the international political and corporate agenda, and public attention is not necessarily drawn by new scientific findings and urgency based on facts, but rather shaped by political action, industry lobbying or extreme weather patterns.

In Germany, where the green industry is booming, the media stands accused of exaggerating the climate change claim. In the U.S., the challenge to scientific claims of global warming due to human activity benefits certain industries. The fossil fuel industry provides substantial financial assistance to its “political allies” and a small number of dissenting scientists to dispute the claims of the larger scientific community. The reliance of politicians and political parties on the financial contributions of the fossil fuel industry in large part (because of their good earnings) to win re-election makes even well-meaning politicians susceptible to the pressure and lure.

Politicians provide a powerful voice to those whose profits depend on continued emission of carbon or green subsidies and funding for alternative energy. It becomes a media event when a politician remarks on a “controversial” topic. In addition, dissident scientists in league with the fossil fuel industry, or NGOs and lobbyists spreading the climate change message and their respective public relations machinery provide a drama that a media bound by journalistic norms gives equal space to the two sides and sensationalises it.

At a certain level, it seems fair to give equal weight to both parties in a dispute. But the problem is that this competition is not about mundane things like groceries, and presenting science as a purely ideological contest is neither fair nor balanced. But even the alternative of supporting one claim or the other is equally fraught with problems. After all, there seems to be a bit of politics built into all aspects of climate change.

White Lies

Our leaders are at each other’s throats, but peace work is progressing behind the theatrics

John Narayan Parajuli, The Kathmandu Post

JAN 21 -Girija Prasad Koirala told European ambassadors last week that he did not share the dire assessment of the United Nations about Nepal’s peace prospects. What makes Koirala optimistic and not others? Perhaps the political developments in Nepal in relation to the peace process should not be taken at face value. There is more to them than meets the eye. Despite the bitter feud among the major parties and the propaganda war between the Maoists and those in the centre-right, there is a positive aspect that has been overshadowed by the public displays of acrimony. For example, we seem to have forgotten to attach enough significance to the release of disqualified Maoist combatants that has taken place at a time when relations between the Maoists and other parties are at their lowest ebb. If the strain on the peace process was so grave that it was teetering on the verge of collapse, why is there ongoing cooperation between the two sides? Moreover, parliament has surprisingly resumed without any public agreements being made.

Perhaps the answer lies in the approaches adopted by successful peace processes elsewhere. The Good Friday agreement that cemented the road to lasting peace in Northern Ireland should be of particular interest to the situation in Nepal. The peace process is far from complete, and it has been occasionally beset by dissident militants. More recently, even personal tragedies at the helm of affairs in Belfast have deferred the process. Early this month, Peter Robinson, the First Minister of the Northern Ireland executive, had to step aside for several weeks after revelations that his wife, a member of parliament and the local assembly, took monetary gifts inappropriately to help her lover. There are telltale signs that the First Minister knew about it and failed to report it. On Jan. 8, a car bomb believed to have been planted by dissident members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) critically injured a police officer — a reminder that even 12 years after the historic agreement in 1998, remnants of the conflict linger on.

But the details of how peace was secured through a complex negotiation process for almost a century-old problem in Belfast makes a fascinating read. There are some salient points that could be of use in Nepal. Of particular value is the approach taken to manage the expectations of the different constituencies that both the republicans and the unionists represented. The British and the Irish governments played an important role both publicly and privately in nudging the parties forward. Progress was made amid rows and public displays of mistrust among the parties in the peace process. The peace process in reality is much longer than the formal agreements. Subsequent agreements took place even after the 1998 agreement as the process moved forward.

Paul Dixon, lecturer in politics at the University of Ulster, has identified nine political skills among the individuals and parties involved in Northern Ireland that he believes gave the peace process momentum even during difficult times. Out of the nine, seven seem relevant in understanding the nuances and dynamics of the peace process in Nepal.

First, choreography and play-acting: Dixon points out that both the British government and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, coordinated events such as the ceasefire through a back channel, yet they maintained room for deniability to manage unintended consequences or fallout. Apparently, the British government even advised the Sinn Fein leader how “best to manage public opinion and criticise the British government”. It is hard to tell if there is any ongoing choreography of the road to peace in Nepal, but the umpteen private meetings that have been held between the top leaders, despite the war of words in public, indicate that a certain level of coordination to manage expectations exists.

Second, smokescreen: Using “hostile rhetoric to disguise a marginally more accommodating stance”. The top leaders on both sides of the ideological divide tried to co-opt and appease “their hardliners by justifying a moderate move as an act of aggression”, whereas a compromise would be rationalised as “a gambit” to gain moral high ground that the opponent cannot match. Excessive rhetoric was utilised as a distraction to push the agreement forward. In Nepal too, the lack of consistency in public deliberations of both the first and second tier leaderships of all the three major parties and constant revisions of their positions suggest different “front stage and back stage realities”.

Third, salami slicing: Dixon argues that the momentum provided by the distraction of a smokescreen would then be used for articulating a more “accommodative line”. This will ensure that hardliners would not interpret it as selling out on ideology. We have seen this tactic being adopted more often by the Maoists. But even within the two non-Maoist parties, the conservative bloc has long accused its top leadership of “surrendering to the Maoists”. Since the fall of the Dahal government, this group has savoured a semblance of victory over the Maoists — securing influential positions in government and the ruling coalition. Recently, in the guise of escalating their agitation, the Maoists without much warning allowed parliament to resume.

Fourth, hard cop/soft cop: Politicians from the same party presented “different faces to different audiences” in a bid to win them over. The leaders of all the three parties make use of this theatrics. The label of hardliner or moderate is distinctly clear among the Maoists. But even within the NC and the UML, there are those who prefer reconciliation with the Maoists and others who favour a tougher approach, at least publicly.

Fifth, kite flying: This approach allows politicians to test the waters before deciding to take a new course of action or moderate their stance. Leaders would write an op-ed piece or ensure a deliberate leak to the press to gauge the reaction of either the party’s constituency or the wider public. Again, the Maoists appear to be leading in the use of this tactic.

Sixth, constructive ambiguity: The key agreements in the peace process were deliberately left vague so that the parties involved could interpret them in their own ways to claim a victory for them. Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement can be described as being constructively ambiguous — especially the clause dealing with rehabilitation and integration of Maoist combatants.

Seventh, necessary fiction: From time to time, outright lies have been told or given sufficient spin to amount to fiction. The purpose of doing this in Northern Ireland was to win over sceptics on both sides. Only time will tell how much fiction we have fallen for in Nepal. Have the politicians deliberately engineered a crisis from time to time to give momentum to the peace process?

It is hard to tell. There are many similarities between the process in Northern Ireland and Nepal. It is possible that the political skills employed for securing peace in Belfast has some resonance in Kathmandu. Of course, Northern Ireland had the relative advantage of concerted international support and mediators like Bill Clinton, John Major and Tony Blair. But without the character and commitment of local actors like Gerry Adams, David Trimble, John Hume and others, the process could have failed.

Are we prepared?

The Kathmandu Post
John Narayan Parajuli
NOV 26 - In less than two weeks, the United Nations Climate Change conference kicks off in Copenhagen, and the signs are already ominous about any breakthrough. A binding treaty with 40 percent reduction in carbon emission (on 1990 levels) by the developed nations and a fund to help the poorest countries mitigate and go green may not be ready in time for the summit. Developing countries like China, India and Brazil are doing more, but the developed countries have got cold feet about financing the poorest countries. And you can’t blame them in these tough economic times when their own coffers are running dry.

But as disagreement persists at the global forum, the problems for Nepal are local. The shrinking snow cover on the Himalaya places Nepal on one of the many frontiers of any battle against climate change. As scientists are playing catch-up with the gravity of the problem, anything they say or their models say should be taken as the least worst scenario. Just last week, scientists with the British Antarctic Survey revised the average global rise in temperature forecast to 6 degrees Celsius from previous the 4. “Oops! We were wrong in our estimates” is a common refrain among the scientific community these days, and we will have to expect more of that. Because climate science isn’t an exact one. But we would do well to err more on the side of caution.

So how is Nepal, as one of least developed countries, prepared to face the brunt? Is there a serious national policy to tackle and mitigate the effects of climate change? Are the government and non-government agencies working on a coherent plan?

Unfortunately, the discourse in most developing countries (including Nepal) on climate change has been focused more on blaming the developed nations, and less on taking initiatives. As a heavily donor-dependent nation, the problems of preparedness are a big issue for Nepal. Associating ourselves with the group of 11 most vulnerable countries (V11) will help to pitch a stronger case for assistance with urgency; but if we don’t help ourselves, there is very little others can do for us. The discussion on climate change is warming up as evidenced by a spike in national media coverage, but our national attitude still is cold towards our own responsibility, even though we want others to do something about it.

On Nov. 15, an international scientific team conducted an assessment tour of the 11 potentially dangerous glacial lakes in the Makalu-Barun National Park area. They also visited the rapidly melting Imja glacier and lake (which feeds some of the big rivers in China, Nepal and India); and though there are no details yet on their conclusion, one can only infer that the rate of melting glaciers and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) is rapidly increasing. As scientists have forecast a more rapid increase in global temperatures, the number of potentially dangerous glacial lakes will subsequently go up. The Himalayan region has witnessed an average increase of temperature by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius since 1975.

In 1995, the danger of Tsho Rolpa Lake bursting downstream was averted with some timely help from the Dutch in painstakingly siphoning out the water. But we weren’t so lucky in the 1980s: Most notable among them was the 1985 Dig Tsho burst that wreaked havoc downstream destroying “houses, farms, bridges and even the Thame micro hydropower plant”. But we still haven’t learnt our lessons.

The government needs to invest in its own capacity building to avert GLOF and mitigate other effects, including the ability to rapidly relocate people from harm’s way of some these dangerous glacial lakes in the event of a disaster. Some experts have already predicted a likelihood of glaciers completely disappearing from the Himalaya by as early as 2035. Planning and preparation needs to take into account the worst case scenario in the future. There is no way of accurately predicting the actual implications; but if what is happening now is any indication, climate change will fundamentally alter the way we live.

Climate change has been increasingly blamed as a trigger for a lot of natural disasters, and perhaps there is some truth in it. But what is also happening as this process moves forward is that there is very little inclination within our national government to take a proactive role in mitigating the effects on its own. In fact, we look with expectant eyes at the West. The developed countries are expected to fix our problem. Sure, there is a degree of culpability that falls on the rich nations, and they have to carry the bigger share of the burden in slowing the effects of this impending disaster. But Nepali officials would do well to remind themselves that though the problem is of a global nature, the worst effects will fall on us.

Poorer countries have to be effective partners on the global stage, and perhaps banding together in V11 will be useful in putting forward a stronger voice; but locally, they have to take their own home-grown initiatives to understand the implications. Presenting a rock from the Himalaya to the president of the United States, or the proposed Himalayan cabinet meeting, or the underwater cabinet meeting in Male may work well as a publicity stunt to get donor and Western attention; but it is a very superficial act, and does not contribute to any local undertaking in dealing with the effects of a warming world. We need to stop collecting evidence for others, while we ourselves seem to live in a state of denial.

I hope that we are not just sending a delegation to Copenhagen for the sake of it; and I hope, as a country increasingly under threat from melting snow on the third pole, our delegation has a concrete plan of action to share with the rest of the world. While it is true that we are in this together, it doesn’t mean the developing countries can afford to hold their breath for the developed countries to walk the talk for them. Once the worst nightmares of climate change begin to unfold, each country will be left to fend for itself. Therefore, any country that prepares and invests in local capacity will be better placed to mitigate the challenges. In the crudest terms, only the fittest will survive.

United States of Europe?

JOHN NARAYAN PARAJULI
The Kathmandu Post

NOV 09 - Upon our arrival at the Heathrow Airport recently, an immigration officer asked me some routine questions. He wanted to know how much my stay would cost me; I replied in Euros rather than Pounds. Perhaps fatigue and having lived in Netherlands recently were to be blamed for the slip. The officer frowned and said: Over here, Pound Sterling is the currency, and we are proud that way.

Britain has maintained a relative distance from some of the European Union’s (EU) common policy, through opt-outs. But there is a growing debate within UK and other member countries on the extent of integration, although mainstream politicians want to clearly avoid it. The Lisbon treaty which will come into force from Dec. 1, following the ratification by Ireland and Czech Republic has triggered fresh discussions. Both Labour and the Conservative Parties in Britain had promised a referendum on the EU constitution. Labour reneged on their promise sometime ago. But the Conservatives who have been jumpy on the issue in the past were buying time to quietly break the news of their change of heart, until they were forced last week after the Czech president signed off on the Treaty.

Now that all ratifications are in on the treaty, Eurocrats may have succeeded in creating a slight distraction, as all eyes are now fixed on the newly created the post of EU President and foreign minister. Tony Blair’s ambitions of becoming the first president of Europe may have been sabotaged. The Conservative Party, which is likely to win the elections, next year, has already opposed Blair’s candidacy.

There is more: Britain’s half-hearted presence within the EU has been frustrating for other EU leaders. It seems British leaders can’t imagine themselves away from the Anglo-Saxon bloc, where they are happy to play second fiddle to the Americans. According to the Guardian, last week the French Minister for Europe, Pierre Lellouche came down heavily on the British Conservative party leaders, and described their policy as ‘autistic’ and blamed them for ‘castrating Britain’s position within Europe.’ “Nobody is going to play with the institutions again. It is going to be, take it or leave it and they should be honest and say that.”

Conflicting impulses

Europe’s problems are manifold: Controlling immigration, maintaining social security amid falling productivity, salvaging some lost glory as the continent where the entire ‘modernisation’ project began. But that’s not all, the core problem that haunts Europe is what it wants to become? Does it want to remain a loose union or push for more integration to become a strong union with federal features? Surely the failed EU Constitution and the current Lisbon Treaty have provided a blueprint, but do the people agree with what the Eurocrats have in mind?

Germany, a key driving force for a stronger Union, like other Euro-heartland countries, remains beset by its own conflicting impulses. The political establishment clearly wants more integration, and was instrumental in drafting the Lisbon Treaty after the Constitution was rejected by French and Dutch voters. Critics allege that the Treaty is a mere repackaging of the rejected Constitution, and they insist that it makes a mockery of the public opinion. The biggest criticism is of the EU is exactly that: the democratic deficit. The European Commission, the executive branch, is not an elected body and its office bearers are not accountable directly to the people. The Lisbon Treaty aims to grant more power to the European Parliament to counter some of the criticism. Critics aren’t happy though. They argue that no amount of patch-work can bridge the fundamental democratic gap within a transnational superstructure like EU.

European Union (EU) is surely a model for political and economic integration, although not a perfect one yet, nevertheless, it is one of a kind. But within the continent the ranks of skeptics are swelling, and even some ‘Euro-believers’ fear the rise of a super-state that would swallow sovereignty of the member states and would eventually march on the path of federalism. While in Nepal, the debate is on devolution of power, here in Europe, the debates are evolving around the extent of integration within a supranational instrument.

In June, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled that many of the competence handed over to the Brussels under the Lisbon Treaty will remain a sovereign German competence. The 8 judges involved also argued that the Lisbon Treaty is merely an international treaty of cooperation. The ruling effectively asked the government to consult the people through a referendum if it were to accept the treaty as a constitutional document. The very thing the treaty was designed to do: to avoid promised national referendum in Czech Republic, Ireland, Denmark, Poland, Portugal and Britain, and other countries where the national constitution stipulates such a provision before the transfer of sovereignty.

The elections for European parliament last year saw in the rise of number of right-wing Member of European Parliament (MEPs), some of whom ran on the platform of working towards abolishing the Union. Of course, it is silly to take a politician’s rhetoric at the face value and seriously believe that Brussels would be powered down; nevertheless their electoral victory is a measure of public’s frustration and resentment with Brussels performance. Right-wing stance may seem ludicrous but it is symptomatic of Europe’s burgeoning problem that could undermine the vision of united Europe.

The failure of Eurocrats to communicate the achievements of their project is equally frustrating. The transnational nature of the set-up allows very little direct contact with people. The democratic deficit is clearly a two-edged sword. Lack of it is equally problematic as its presence may be to the politicians. During a visit to Brussels in April this year, a spokesman for the EU Competition Commissioner, and some journalists who had gone native (by virtue of having spent too many years in Brussels), bitterly complained about how the national press treats Brussels: When everything goes fine, it is out of the press radar, but when something goes wrong national politicians rub it on Brussels, and EU gets hammered badly by the press.

We want results

The Kathmandu Post
John Narayan Parajuli

OCT 26 - Despite the ongoing political deadlock and the bad blood between the UML-led coalition and the Maoists, something tangible happened early this month that could go some way in securing lasting peace: the first steps towards addressing the status of the Maoist army. Despite the doom and gloom emanating from the rhetoric of the top leaders, there is room for optimism from the work that has been happening away from the constant glare of the media.

The government intends to separate the disqualified Maoist combatants from the cantonments and house them separately in a transit facility by Nov. 22. That is an ambitious timeline given past experience. One can only hope that the process doesn’t get stalled again like it did back in July. But the government and the UN agencies can do a number of things to ensure that the process sails smoothly.

The cooperation of the Maoists is vital to its success. The government and the international community have to dangle both the carrot and the stick. One of the reasons why the Maoists want to cooperate is their own difficulties in keeping the combatants at ease. They have been getting increasingly restive about the peace process that has brought almost no dividends since they were put into the cantonments. Their discharge and the subsequent plan for their rehabilitation gives the Maoist leadership an argument with the combatants that this is a win-win situation.

The Maoists also have some genuine concerns about releasing these ex-combatants into society without a solid plan. One has to be careful about the potential of these ex-combatants being lured into other armed groups. Matrika Yadav’s reconstituted outfit has already poached some combatants from the cantonments. It is conceivable that Yadav hopes to expand his organization by recruiting demobbed combatants. I hope there is a plan to deal with that possibility and that we are not simply discharging combatants of one army to supply recruits for another.

Strings attached
The financial assistance provided by the international community for the upkeep of the combatants and other areas of the peace process have to be tied to compliance within a given time-frame.

Norway announced an aid package of “US$ 5 million for the discharge and rehabilitation of disqualified Maoist army personnel on the condition that concrete progress gets underway and formal discharge takes place by Jan. 22, 2010.” Other donors should follow suit and pool their weight to put pressure on both the government and the party leaders. The international community should make it clear that the support for the peace process isn’t unconditional. Not to do so now will only be seen as rewarding unacceptable behaviour. Politicians are already operating under the assumption that the deadline for writing the constitution will be extended, and there is little tangible pressure on them to assume otherwise.

Lack of clear strategy
The urgency shown by the prime minister in dealing with the issue of the combatants shows his sensitivity towards the biggest stumbling block in the peace process, but he shouldn’t forget the bigger picture. Discharging combatants is only one aspect of the larger security agenda. The debate on Security Sector Reform (SSR) is not even at an embryonic stage. Prime Minister Nepal should take the initiative to convene an all-party panel and expert panel — similar to the Army Integration Special Committee — to look at the debate. Without doing a detailed study of Nepal’s security needs, issues of rehabilitation, integration and rightsizing of the army cannot be completed.

The prime minister has an opportunity, no matter how long his government lasts, to contribute towards the sustainability of the peace process. His party’s position is more acceptable among the two extremes represented by both the Maoists and the Nepali Congress on the issue of SSR. He is in a position to explore more common grounds with both the NC and the Maoists in areas where there is shared interest to expedite things related to the peace process.

The prime minister should also consider issuing a gag order on matters related to the peace process on his ministers who often speak their mind too freely — contradicting the government’s position and contributing to an environment of mistrust. Defence Minister Bidya Devi Bhandari’s statements have been least helpful. The Maoists maybe hell-bent on seeing this government fail, but they have to admit there are certain areas they want to wish otherwise. There could be many more areas of common interest only if they stop talking past each other.

Despite apprehensions about the Maoists’ democratic credibility, there is no doubt that they want to sit through the peace process. Sure, they have their own internal contradictions and different strands of thinking within the party where they are constantly negotiating, but so far they have remained within the general parameters of the peace process. Indeed, there is an element of good faith and bad faith on both sides. And in areas where it is politically expedient for them to cooperate, the Maoists have been more than willing to do so. The same is more or less true of the other parties. The parties will only move forward with urgency in implementing the peace process where it serves their interest.

That is where the international community and civil society needs to play a more effective role in encouraging the politicians where it works and showing some tough love where it doesn’t. Both the donors and civil society have underestimated their own ability; they can easily do more if they stand united. It is high time they put pressure on Nepal’s lackadaisical politicians. The country cannot hold its breath each time the politicians go to the edge, look over and pull back at the last minute. The international community should certainly demand more bang for their buck.

(jnparajuli@gmail.com)

No time to stay cool

Kathmandu is awash with rumours and speculation about an imminent military coup with a civilian face. Some believe that it may happen well before September 10, the day Army Chief Rukmangad Katawal retires. But he is required to take a mandatory leave a month prior to his retirement. Now several things have happened since the beginning of April this year that provides some credence to the theory that Nepal's Army chief is seriously testing the water for a military takeover. The ruse it appears is to preempt a Maoist takeover.
When the Maoists led government sought a clarification from the General in April, there was a story in the press, of a dramatic exchange between the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) that gave an account of a 'soft' coup that was planned by competing factions, but was averted by the leadership of General Katawal. The story was reported in The Kathmandu Post and Kantipur daily on April 24. The reason I think it was planted and that the exchange might have never taken place is based on two facts.

First, General Kul Bahadur Khadka says that the narrative about him in press story was ingenious but untrue. Second, General Katawal appears to be the calm, composed and rational military leader in the narrative, thus the hero in the story.
So it appears some within the military intelligence planted the story to achieve two things: one, to prove that Khadka was the bad guy and that the Maoists have tried to split and weaken the Army, the last line of defense against the Maoists takeover, by infiltrating it and pushing for wholesale integration. Second, it was a way to test the water: for the reaction of parties, international community and the public.
Since that incident, the Maoist led government was forced to resign, and it is not a secret that the Army had a say in the formation of the new government. The leadership of the Army that accepted civilian control following the demise of monarchy, has suddenly tasted some serious political clout in the new republic, and perhaps now feels invincible to rush headlong into a conflict with any political or military force within the country. In recent weeks, General Katawal has actively met political and diplomatic actors often with an unnecessary military entourage to sell his version of Nepal's impending apocalypse at the hands of the Maoists
Doesn't this rhetoric sound similar to that before February 1, 2005? Then, the United States tacitly backed the King in the belief that the monarchy and the Army were the only running horse and the last line of defense against a complete Maoist takeover. They condoned the squeezing of the democratic space, which expedited the end of the monarchy and the propelling of the Maoists to state power, albeit through democratic means. The paranoia about Maoist takeover then was exaggerated, and is equally so today. Anyone who is listening to these individuals who were instrumental in the downfall of the monarchy, is not in the right frame of mind. At best, it will only provide a ruse for the dismantling of the Nepal Army, should such a misadventure fail. Foolhardiness of few individuals will sink the entire Army.
Any militarization of politics, 'soft or hard', will only take us decades behind, and would protract the involvement and commitment of the international community here. It will actually play into the Maoist strategy. In the short term, it may provide a semblance of victory for the detractors of the Maoists, but in the end, will only act as a catalyst for consolidation of Maoist power.
Right-leaning politicians may be right to think of ways to stop the march of the Maoists, but military solutions should not be among them. As for Indians, it will have a bigger internal security implication, not necessarily from the Nepali Maoists but from their own. It will send the wrong message to the insurgents operating within the length and breadth of the country and would throw the chances of peaceful solution there out of the window.
The Maoists are a formidable force, but any militaristic thinking of the situation will only serve the interest of some individuals with deeply vested interests and the weapons cartel that stand to lose from the peace process. I hope both the politicians and the international community, especially, the Indians, the Americans, the Chinese and the Europeans will draw a line and say enough is enough to those behind the coup chatter. By courting the Generals too much, the ministers in the government, the president's office, and the diplomats are only giving the few adventurists in the military a toehold in the political turf. Before they realize, jarsaabs will have their whole foot and body inside the forbidden door of politics. It is one thing for the international community to maintain a line of communication with the military, and completely another to listen to the crazy idea of sabotaging the fledgling peace process.
By validating the decision taken by the President to revoke the decision of Prime Minister Dahal, the current government has effectively set a precedent that authorizes the President to take extra-constitutional decisions in the guise of political complication. The better course would have been to let the Supreme Court decide the matter. Even the hereditary monarchs hesitated after 1990, with the exception of King Gyanendra's takeover, to so overtly reverse the decision of an elected executive without seeking legal advice from the Supreme Court.
Now that we have a presidential precedent, and an ambitious General who is seeking to extend his tenure, only an international community that proactively condemns any further militarization of Nepali politics can prevent the self-fulfilling prophesies of the Maoists and jarsaabs alike.

Published in The Kathmandu Post on July 17, 09