The Kathmandu Post On Saturday
Feb 27 - Howard Zinn, a radical historian best known for his book A People’s History of the United States, in which he celebrated the contribution of feminists, workers and coloured people, died on Jan. 28. He was 87. An incorrigible peace-monger and often referred to as a “people’s historian”, he inspired a generation of activists and authors to oppose wars and other military interventions. In his July 2009 column for the Progressive, he wrote, “…We are smart in so many ways. Surely, we should be able to understand that in between war and passivity, there are a thousand possibilities.”
His opposition to wars was shaped by his personal experience as a bombardier during the Second World War. When the war ended, he put his medals in an envelope, and wrote ‘never again’ on it. Referring to the Second World War, he said in a recent interview with The New York Times: “I would not deny that war had a certain moral core, but that made it easier for Americans to treat all subsequent wars with a kind of glow. Every enemy becomes Hitler.”
After the war, he worked odd jobs, and entered New York University on GI Bill and received his bachelor’s from there. GI Bill was a government scheme that provided education and training to returning World War II veterans. Later he received his Master’s degree from Columbia University.
He was a polarising figure in a country where chauvinism, the idea of American exceptionalism, and songs of benign hegemony continues to be sung to this day. He chose to shine light on the atrocities of the past, and tried to unravel the tidying up of history books. Even in the left-liberal circle, despite admiring his candidness, some took a skeptical view of his version of history.
I had corresponded with him over email in September 2004 while reviewing one of his books for the Nation Weekly, a short-lived newsweekly. In a typical journalistic illusion of being a resourceful individual, I shot an email to him after I found his address through Google; I was rather surprised by how accessible he turned out to be. I had not expected to hear back from him; I just wanted to feel better that I at least tried. He was against elitism and practised what he preached.
I asked him what was the message he was trying to get across in his book On War (it is published in South Asia as Rule by Force)? In response, Zinn said that his “book is intended to show by historical example, personal experience and logical argument that war is not morally acceptable or practically effective as a solution for whatever problems we face in the world.”
The title of his lucid, engaging autobiography—You Can’t Stay Neutral on a Moving Train—sums up the position he took. Zinn’s views are always powerfully expressed and often sharply at odds with conventional wisdom. He once said that his own experience crystallised his opposition to all wars. “After my own experience in that war, I moved away from my own rather orthodox view that there are just and unjust wars, to a universal rejection of war as a solution to any human problem.”
Equally unorthodox is his rejection of the common view of the historian as an impartial observer. He once remarked, “Objectivity is impossible, and it is also undesirable.” His writings are powerful partly because they are partisan. He contends that American history is an account of how an air of nobility was accorded to “ugly realities” by sympathetic chroniclers. He gives many examples of how even profound believers in democratic ideals have trampled on others’ rights in the name of “nationalism and expansionism” since the period immediately after the American independence.
Noam Chomsky said of his old friend Zinn: “Both by his actions, and his writings for 50 years, he played a powerful role in helping and in many ways inspiring the Civil rights movement and the anti-war movement.”
Writing on U.S. foreign policy, Zinn said: “In the United States today, the Declaration of Independence hangs on schoolroom walls, but foreign policy follows Machiavelli.” He further claimed that a nation’s relative liberalism at home often serves to distract domestic attention away from the ruthlessness abroad.
His criticism of the American government may strike many as hyperbolic. In his essay On Libya, he argued that if the Libyan leader Khadafi was one face of terrorism, the other was President Ronald Reagan during his presidency. “Does a Western democracy have a better right to kill innocent people than a Middle Eastern dictatorship?” In one of his essays Of Fish and Fishermen, Zinn offers a powerful metaphor about the need to reverse the perspective to see the horror of war: He refers to an eerie movie clip in which the fisherman gets hooked instead of the fish and makes a desperate bid for escape. For the first time the fisherman gets to see himself from the standpoint of the fish. The image of the fisherman is used to explain why there was a Japanese pacifist movement following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
He was involved in the civil rights movement, but Vietnam soon became the focus of his opposition. In his essay, A Speech for LBJ (President Lyndon Johnson) he suggested that the then-president tell the nation: “No one in the world needs to be told how powerful we are. We can stay in Vietnam as long as we like. We can reduce the whole country to ashes. We are powerful enough to do this. But we are not cruel enough to do this. I as your president am not willing to engage in a war without end that would destroy the youth of this nation and the people of Vietnam.”
Zinn would find the equivalence between Vietnam and Iraq obvious. “All wars,” he said, “present agonizing moral questions,” and every war has two faces. If one face of the war in Iraq is promoting democracy and emancipating Iraqis from the ruthless chains of Saddam’s tyranny, the other face is unending violence and mounting human casualties.
Writing for the Nation, the American newspaper, right before he died, he said he was struggling to find a “highlight” of Obama’s presidency. Speaking at a Boston University lecture series named after him, where he was a professor emeritus of political science, he criticised Obama for not delivering on his rhetoric. “I believe he is dominated by the same forces that have determined American foreign policy since World War II—the military-industrial complex,” Zinn said. “He showed his subservience to the militarists as soon as he appointed Hillary Clinton as secretary of state and Robert Gates as secretary of defense. By surrounding himself with hawks, he has made it inevitable that he would pursue an aggressive military posture,” he told his audience.
Zinn’s insistence that there is no such thing as a “just or righteous war” is a challenge to the world to confront issues of justice, not without a struggle, but without war. And perhaps that anti-violence, anti-war conscience is his legacy.
Saturday, February 27, 2010
All those years ago
The Kathmandu Post
Feb 24 - In January 2008, I was in Narsingh VDC in Sunsari district, a predominantly Madhesi area, on a reporting assignment. I was forced into an argument with a group of locals about the mistreatment of Madhesis by the state. As the discussion progressed, a teacher raised a point about my job that forced me to think. She said that the fact that a Pahade had come to report from Madhes was evidence in itself of the continuing domination of Madhesis by others. Was I guilty?
That encounter shook me up a bit; but the incident also revealed the level of animosity between the two communities and its misdirection. I managed to convince them that I as an individual could not account for their suffering though I condemn any mistreatment, and that only the state could answer their charges; and that as a journalist, I was doing something to get their views across. Though legitimate, their grievances and anger were clearly misaimed.
Does the fact that the ruling elite had been dominated by Pahades/Chhetris/ Brahmins — which nevertheless also included the elite from other communities including Madhesis — in the last 30 years justify painting all Pahades with the same brush? Of course, any sensible person will disapprove of it. But like any other society passing through a phase of half-boiled revolution and transformation, a sense of historical right and wrong is among the preoccupations of certain sections in Nepal. And in times of crisis, expediency, not factualness, drives these considerations. Like all re-readings of history, one can’t escape from the inherent flaws associated with the process for it takes place entirely to justify or condemn the larger political process.
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his conquests have been a subject of much debate in the last few years. Many have condemned him and his acts, while others still see him as one of the few visionaries modern Nepal ever had. It is not surprising that Shah’s inadequacies are glossed over in the history books. All history is embellished or distorted, and no historical figure can withstand critical scrutiny for that matter.
Friedrich Nietzsche, writing in his essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, said that an excess of history was harmful, and that it prevents a man, nation or culture from acting “unhistorically” — meaning without the past in the mind. Such an acute sense of history shackles a nation and does not make it free. He identifies three types of history: monumental, antiquarian and critical.
The monumental approach is preferred by the powerful and men of actions who see no peers in contemporary society and instead look back to the past for comfort and guidance. Even the past suffers at the hands of monumental historians. Sections of the past are wilfully forgotten or ignored, whereas a few selective facts and individuals “rise out like islands”. The antiquarian approach reveres and strives to preserve the past; it looks more at the past and its glory than towards the future. The critical approach judges and condemns the injustice and the cruelty of the past, but also upholds what is right. It is not a sweeping condemnation.
Nietzsche argued that each of these approaches may be appropriate depending on the “soil and climate”. But he cautioned that excess indulgence or lack of clarity of purpose was always dangerous, “A critic without the need for the criticism, the antiquarian without the piety for the past, or the man who recognises the greatness of the past but himself cannot accomplish any greatness.”
It is easy to make sweeping statements (good or bad) about the past; it is still easier to condemn and crucify historical figures, but that doesn’t undo the past, nor does it make it right. We cannot force our modern sensibilities on the past. It is one thing to use history for a context and completely another to attempt to rewrite it. I think it is tempting to disown the past entirely and rewrite it according to the mood of the time. But how does that make us any different from the historians of the past who wrote the history to suit the winners of the time? A critical reading of history is desirable as long as it is not motivated by vengeance. A wholesale rejection of our “monumental” history suffers from the same folly as wholesale acceptance.
People who indulge too much in the past without the need are merely trying to find an excuse for their present failures. These are not ordinary people who have to slog day in and day out for mere sustenance, but rather demagogues, moral and ethnic entrepreneurs who lack solutions and instead create problems. Many of our “revolutionaries” who tried to strip the country of its past in a zeal of corrective vengeance by demolishing many statues around the country should hear this piece of admonishment from the original republicans and revolutionaries in the modern sense.
During the French Revolution, a tide of popular iconoclasm had swept the country that led to the destruction of works of art that were associated with the monarchy. In his address to the revolution’s foot soldiers and vandals, Abbe Gregoire, a prominent member of the revolution’s Committee of Public Instruction, made his case clear in a rhetorical question: “Because the pyramids of Egypt had been built by tyranny and for tyranny, ought these monuments of antiquity be demolished?”
Should we let the tyranny of Nepal’s past make its present equally tyrannical? Or should we learn from the past’s tyranny to not repeat it? Whether we choose to use history in the right vein or abuse it for short-term political expediency will determine how the present is judged by the future, and more importantly whether we remain shackled to the past or move forward into the future. Prof. Mahendra Lawoti, in his article (“It ain’t so,” Feb. 19, Page 6) suggested that an apology would begin the “healing process”. But I wonder who it should come from.
john.parajuli@gmail.com
Feb 24 - In January 2008, I was in Narsingh VDC in Sunsari district, a predominantly Madhesi area, on a reporting assignment. I was forced into an argument with a group of locals about the mistreatment of Madhesis by the state. As the discussion progressed, a teacher raised a point about my job that forced me to think. She said that the fact that a Pahade had come to report from Madhes was evidence in itself of the continuing domination of Madhesis by others. Was I guilty?
That encounter shook me up a bit; but the incident also revealed the level of animosity between the two communities and its misdirection. I managed to convince them that I as an individual could not account for their suffering though I condemn any mistreatment, and that only the state could answer their charges; and that as a journalist, I was doing something to get their views across. Though legitimate, their grievances and anger were clearly misaimed.
Does the fact that the ruling elite had been dominated by Pahades/Chhetris/ Brahmins — which nevertheless also included the elite from other communities including Madhesis — in the last 30 years justify painting all Pahades with the same brush? Of course, any sensible person will disapprove of it. But like any other society passing through a phase of half-boiled revolution and transformation, a sense of historical right and wrong is among the preoccupations of certain sections in Nepal. And in times of crisis, expediency, not factualness, drives these considerations. Like all re-readings of history, one can’t escape from the inherent flaws associated with the process for it takes place entirely to justify or condemn the larger political process.
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his conquests have been a subject of much debate in the last few years. Many have condemned him and his acts, while others still see him as one of the few visionaries modern Nepal ever had. It is not surprising that Shah’s inadequacies are glossed over in the history books. All history is embellished or distorted, and no historical figure can withstand critical scrutiny for that matter.
Friedrich Nietzsche, writing in his essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, said that an excess of history was harmful, and that it prevents a man, nation or culture from acting “unhistorically” — meaning without the past in the mind. Such an acute sense of history shackles a nation and does not make it free. He identifies three types of history: monumental, antiquarian and critical.
The monumental approach is preferred by the powerful and men of actions who see no peers in contemporary society and instead look back to the past for comfort and guidance. Even the past suffers at the hands of monumental historians. Sections of the past are wilfully forgotten or ignored, whereas a few selective facts and individuals “rise out like islands”. The antiquarian approach reveres and strives to preserve the past; it looks more at the past and its glory than towards the future. The critical approach judges and condemns the injustice and the cruelty of the past, but also upholds what is right. It is not a sweeping condemnation.
Nietzsche argued that each of these approaches may be appropriate depending on the “soil and climate”. But he cautioned that excess indulgence or lack of clarity of purpose was always dangerous, “A critic without the need for the criticism, the antiquarian without the piety for the past, or the man who recognises the greatness of the past but himself cannot accomplish any greatness.”
It is easy to make sweeping statements (good or bad) about the past; it is still easier to condemn and crucify historical figures, but that doesn’t undo the past, nor does it make it right. We cannot force our modern sensibilities on the past. It is one thing to use history for a context and completely another to attempt to rewrite it. I think it is tempting to disown the past entirely and rewrite it according to the mood of the time. But how does that make us any different from the historians of the past who wrote the history to suit the winners of the time? A critical reading of history is desirable as long as it is not motivated by vengeance. A wholesale rejection of our “monumental” history suffers from the same folly as wholesale acceptance.
People who indulge too much in the past without the need are merely trying to find an excuse for their present failures. These are not ordinary people who have to slog day in and day out for mere sustenance, but rather demagogues, moral and ethnic entrepreneurs who lack solutions and instead create problems. Many of our “revolutionaries” who tried to strip the country of its past in a zeal of corrective vengeance by demolishing many statues around the country should hear this piece of admonishment from the original republicans and revolutionaries in the modern sense.
During the French Revolution, a tide of popular iconoclasm had swept the country that led to the destruction of works of art that were associated with the monarchy. In his address to the revolution’s foot soldiers and vandals, Abbe Gregoire, a prominent member of the revolution’s Committee of Public Instruction, made his case clear in a rhetorical question: “Because the pyramids of Egypt had been built by tyranny and for tyranny, ought these monuments of antiquity be demolished?”
Should we let the tyranny of Nepal’s past make its present equally tyrannical? Or should we learn from the past’s tyranny to not repeat it? Whether we choose to use history in the right vein or abuse it for short-term political expediency will determine how the present is judged by the future, and more importantly whether we remain shackled to the past or move forward into the future. Prof. Mahendra Lawoti, in his article (“It ain’t so,” Feb. 19, Page 6) suggested that an apology would begin the “healing process”. But I wonder who it should come from.
john.parajuli@gmail.com
Monday, February 15, 2010
Himalayan howler
The climate debate has exposed the entangled link between press, politics and science
The Kathmandu Post
John Narayan Parajuli
FEB 14 -
The Nepali cabinet meeting at Everest base camp in December last year may have helped to highlight the effects of climate change in the Himalaya in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, but the revelation of a serious omission in the projection by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has set in motion a debate that is likely to undermine the very basis of climate claim in the region. Facts on the ground notwithstanding, such high profile “crying wolf” about the intensity of the process is likely to weaken even realistic claims about the region. Add to that Indian Environment Minister Jayaram Ramesh’s hard line against melting glaciers in the Himalaya or cutting carbon emissions by India.
It is understandable that India, like China, does not want to commit itself to a target that would jeopardise its own growth, but it is myopia of Himalayan proportions not to take into account a cost-benefit analysis of the long-term environmental impact. There is clearly a divide even among the developing countries. Those that are rapidly developing and industrialising do not want to give up their “right” to burn more fossil fuels on their path to prosperity. Those who are downright poor and have no greater prospects for an industrial revolution and are at the worst receiving end of climate change are clamouring for action. But who is listening besides, of course, the lip service and unbinding commitments?
A glance at the geopolitics of negotiating international environmental negotiations on climate change at the Copenhagen Summit draws attention to the tricky issues of international political economy — different North-South priorities and responsibilities, as well as different levels of susceptibility to climate change. Poorer countries are much more vulnerable than richer countries; logically they want prosperous countries to cushion the effects for them. But the overriding assumption at the Copenhagen Summit was that science as an international enterprise is a neutral process aloof from political and social underpinnings of the environment it operates within. But the work of Golinski and others indicate that even the very “hardest” strain of science is not free from social relations.
Prof. David Demeritt of King’s College London, in a journal article in 2001 entitled “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, said. “[T]o insist, therefore, that science is also political, in the broadest sense of that word, is not to say that science is only political and thereby collapse entirely the distinction between the two. It is to recognise how problematic this distinction is. The social relations that science involves necessarily influence both the character of scientific understandings upstream and the particular political outcomes that may result from them downstream in legislation or administrative law rulings.”
The extent of ideological closure on issues on both sides of the climate change divide (anthropogenic/natural or happening/hoax) in the global North, and between the countries in the North and the South, is now becoming more apparent. The IPCC’s cavalier sourcing of WWF’s erroneously published report on Himalayan glaciers combined with the e-mail scandal from the University of East Anglia has emboldened the critics so much so that the British minister responsible for climate was forced to declare war against the climate change sceptics. It almost sounds like some politicians need climate change to be happening to grind their own axe.
Is this unravelling simply a human error or is it more human than researchers would like to admit? What does this tell us about the gung-ho climate change believers (including East Anglia scientists who have shied away from being transparent about the process by which they drew their conclusions) or the gung-ho sceptics? Can we say for sure that their work is entirely apolitical, and that they are not driven by some ideological considerations? For example, the belief that the climate is changing, hence it must be proven by any means. Or it is a left-liberal conspiracy, and that all the facts are cooked. And how does the media fare, where a contest for the hearts and minds of the public is raging?
The answer to these questions is not easily forthcoming. But the debate on climate change has highlighted how entangled the relationship is between the press, politics and science; and how different perceptions are formed from the same facts. Different interpretations of scientific facts have either belittled or exaggerated the science behind environmental degradation; both extremes are risky because it foments either complacency or panic among the public and the policy makers. Politicians and interest groups have hijacked the scientific agenda. For better or worse, the scientific claims have now become part of the international political and corporate agenda, and public attention is not necessarily drawn by new scientific findings and urgency based on facts, but rather shaped by political action, industry lobbying or extreme weather patterns.
In Germany, where the green industry is booming, the media stands accused of exaggerating the climate change claim. In the U.S., the challenge to scientific claims of global warming due to human activity benefits certain industries. The fossil fuel industry provides substantial financial assistance to its “political allies” and a small number of dissenting scientists to dispute the claims of the larger scientific community. The reliance of politicians and political parties on the financial contributions of the fossil fuel industry in large part (because of their good earnings) to win re-election makes even well-meaning politicians susceptible to the pressure and lure.
Politicians provide a powerful voice to those whose profits depend on continued emission of carbon or green subsidies and funding for alternative energy. It becomes a media event when a politician remarks on a “controversial” topic. In addition, dissident scientists in league with the fossil fuel industry, or NGOs and lobbyists spreading the climate change message and their respective public relations machinery provide a drama that a media bound by journalistic norms gives equal space to the two sides and sensationalises it.
At a certain level, it seems fair to give equal weight to both parties in a dispute. But the problem is that this competition is not about mundane things like groceries, and presenting science as a purely ideological contest is neither fair nor balanced. But even the alternative of supporting one claim or the other is equally fraught with problems. After all, there seems to be a bit of politics built into all aspects of climate change.
The Kathmandu Post
John Narayan Parajuli
FEB 14 -
The Nepali cabinet meeting at Everest base camp in December last year may have helped to highlight the effects of climate change in the Himalaya in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, but the revelation of a serious omission in the projection by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has set in motion a debate that is likely to undermine the very basis of climate claim in the region. Facts on the ground notwithstanding, such high profile “crying wolf” about the intensity of the process is likely to weaken even realistic claims about the region. Add to that Indian Environment Minister Jayaram Ramesh’s hard line against melting glaciers in the Himalaya or cutting carbon emissions by India.
It is understandable that India, like China, does not want to commit itself to a target that would jeopardise its own growth, but it is myopia of Himalayan proportions not to take into account a cost-benefit analysis of the long-term environmental impact. There is clearly a divide even among the developing countries. Those that are rapidly developing and industrialising do not want to give up their “right” to burn more fossil fuels on their path to prosperity. Those who are downright poor and have no greater prospects for an industrial revolution and are at the worst receiving end of climate change are clamouring for action. But who is listening besides, of course, the lip service and unbinding commitments?
A glance at the geopolitics of negotiating international environmental negotiations on climate change at the Copenhagen Summit draws attention to the tricky issues of international political economy — different North-South priorities and responsibilities, as well as different levels of susceptibility to climate change. Poorer countries are much more vulnerable than richer countries; logically they want prosperous countries to cushion the effects for them. But the overriding assumption at the Copenhagen Summit was that science as an international enterprise is a neutral process aloof from political and social underpinnings of the environment it operates within. But the work of Golinski and others indicate that even the very “hardest” strain of science is not free from social relations.
Prof. David Demeritt of King’s College London, in a journal article in 2001 entitled “The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science”, said. “[T]o insist, therefore, that science is also political, in the broadest sense of that word, is not to say that science is only political and thereby collapse entirely the distinction between the two. It is to recognise how problematic this distinction is. The social relations that science involves necessarily influence both the character of scientific understandings upstream and the particular political outcomes that may result from them downstream in legislation or administrative law rulings.”
The extent of ideological closure on issues on both sides of the climate change divide (anthropogenic/natural or happening/hoax) in the global North, and between the countries in the North and the South, is now becoming more apparent. The IPCC’s cavalier sourcing of WWF’s erroneously published report on Himalayan glaciers combined with the e-mail scandal from the University of East Anglia has emboldened the critics so much so that the British minister responsible for climate was forced to declare war against the climate change sceptics. It almost sounds like some politicians need climate change to be happening to grind their own axe.
Is this unravelling simply a human error or is it more human than researchers would like to admit? What does this tell us about the gung-ho climate change believers (including East Anglia scientists who have shied away from being transparent about the process by which they drew their conclusions) or the gung-ho sceptics? Can we say for sure that their work is entirely apolitical, and that they are not driven by some ideological considerations? For example, the belief that the climate is changing, hence it must be proven by any means. Or it is a left-liberal conspiracy, and that all the facts are cooked. And how does the media fare, where a contest for the hearts and minds of the public is raging?
The answer to these questions is not easily forthcoming. But the debate on climate change has highlighted how entangled the relationship is between the press, politics and science; and how different perceptions are formed from the same facts. Different interpretations of scientific facts have either belittled or exaggerated the science behind environmental degradation; both extremes are risky because it foments either complacency or panic among the public and the policy makers. Politicians and interest groups have hijacked the scientific agenda. For better or worse, the scientific claims have now become part of the international political and corporate agenda, and public attention is not necessarily drawn by new scientific findings and urgency based on facts, but rather shaped by political action, industry lobbying or extreme weather patterns.
In Germany, where the green industry is booming, the media stands accused of exaggerating the climate change claim. In the U.S., the challenge to scientific claims of global warming due to human activity benefits certain industries. The fossil fuel industry provides substantial financial assistance to its “political allies” and a small number of dissenting scientists to dispute the claims of the larger scientific community. The reliance of politicians and political parties on the financial contributions of the fossil fuel industry in large part (because of their good earnings) to win re-election makes even well-meaning politicians susceptible to the pressure and lure.
Politicians provide a powerful voice to those whose profits depend on continued emission of carbon or green subsidies and funding for alternative energy. It becomes a media event when a politician remarks on a “controversial” topic. In addition, dissident scientists in league with the fossil fuel industry, or NGOs and lobbyists spreading the climate change message and their respective public relations machinery provide a drama that a media bound by journalistic norms gives equal space to the two sides and sensationalises it.
At a certain level, it seems fair to give equal weight to both parties in a dispute. But the problem is that this competition is not about mundane things like groceries, and presenting science as a purely ideological contest is neither fair nor balanced. But even the alternative of supporting one claim or the other is equally fraught with problems. After all, there seems to be a bit of politics built into all aspects of climate change.
युरोपेली संघका चुनौती
जोननारायण पराजुली
कान्तिपुर
फाल्गुन १ -
गत साल लन्डनको हिथ्रो विमानस्थलको अध्यागमनमा एक अधिकारीले मलाई केही प्रश्न सोध्ने क्रममा मेरो बेलायत बसाइमा लाग्ने खर्चका बारेमा पनि सोधे । यसको जवाफमा मैले यति खर्च लाग्छ भन्दा 'पाउण्ड' मा नभनी 'युरो' मा भन्न
पुगेछु । सायद यात्राको थकान वा केही महिनाअघिमात्र नेदरल्यान्ड बसेकाले मेरो जिब्रो चिप्लेको हुनसक्छ । तर ती अधिकारीले त्यसलाई गम्भीरतापूर्वक
लिए । उनले भने, 'हामी यहाँ बेलायती पाउन्ड स्टर्लिङ चलाउँछौं र यसमा गर्व पनि गर्छौं ।' मजस्ता तेस्रो देशबाट युरोप प्रवेश गर्ने आगन्तुकले युरोपेली संघ -ईयू) का सदस्य राष्ट्रभरि नै समान नीतिको अपेक्षा गर्नु स्वभाविकै हो । अझ खासगरी नेदरल्यान्ड, जर्मनीजस्ता 'युरोपको मुट' भनिने मुलुकमा केही समय बिताएपछि संघका अन्य राष्ट्रमा पनि त्यस्तै व्यवहारको अपेक्षा हुँदोरहेछ ।
भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी विदेशमन्त्री हेनरी किसिन्जरले विभाजित युरोपप्रति व्यङ्ग्य गर्दै युरोपमा रहँदा मैले कोसँग छलफल गर्नु भन्दै प्रश्न उठाएका थिए । किसिन्जरको प्रश्नलाई उक्त संघका विरोधी एवं समर्थक दुवैथरीले आज पनि युरोपको सवालमा प्रयोग गर्ने
गर्छन् । गत मंसिर १६ गतेदेखि कार्यान्वयनमा आएको लिस्बन सन्धिले दुईवटा पदको सिर्जना गरेर किसिन्जरले उक्त सवाल उठाएको ३६ वर्षपछि जवाफ दिएको छ । यसैबीच संघको प्रथम राष्ट्रपति र विदेश मन्त्रीको निर्वाचन पनि सम्पन्न भइसकेको छ । तर आलंकारिक कार्यकारी पदको सिर्जना गर्दैमा संघको भावी कार्यदिशाप्रतिको विवाद र संरचनागत कमजोरीको पूर्णरूपमा समाधान हुन्छ भन्ने ग्यारेन्टी छैन ।
बेलायतले अहिलेसम्म पनि 'ओप्ट आउट' -कुनै नीतिबाट बाहिरिने व्यवस्था) मार्फत युरो साझा मौदि्रक नीतिजस्ता संघका साझा नीतिबाट आफूलाई टाढा राख्दै आएको छ । त्यसो त डेनमार्क चारवटा 'ओप्ट आउट' मार्फत टाढा बसेको छ । संघका २७ सदस्य राष्ट्रमध्ये त्यस्तै नीति अख्तियार गर्ने सदस्यको सङ्ख्या ६ पुगेको छ । बेलायत तथा अन्य सदस्य राष्ट्रभित्रै पनि 'एकता र समायोजनको हद' र 'सीमा' बारेमा विवाद उठ्दै आएको छ । मूलतः राष्ट्रिय सार्वभौमिकतालाई युरोपेली समायोजनको लागि कुन हदसम्म समर्पण गर्ने भन्ने विवाद हो । तथापि राजनीतिज्ञहरू यस विषयलाई टाढै राख्न चाहन्छन् ।
बेलायतका लेबर र कन्जर्भेटिभ दुवै पार्टीले युरोपेली संविधानको बारेमा जनमतसंग्रह गर्ने वाचा गरेका थिए । तर हाल आएर दुवै पार्टीले आफ्नो अडान परिवर्तन गरेका छन् ।
युरोपेली संघमा भित्री मनदेखि सहभागी नभएको भन्ने आरोप बेलायतले खेप्दै आएको छ । बेलायत आफूलाई अमेरिका तथा अङ्ग्रेजीभाषी राष्ट्रको समूहबाट टाढा राखेको देख्न चाहँदैन । बेलायती दैनिक 'द गार्जियन' का अनुसार केही महिनाअघि युरोपका लागि पेन्च मन्त्री पियरे लेल्युचेले कन्जर्भेटिभ पार्टीलाई 'युरोपमा बेलायतको स्थानलाई अवमूल्यन गरेको' भन्ने कडा टिप्पणी गरेका थिए । 'कसैले पनि संघसँग खेलबाड नगरोस्, अब इमानदार भएर संघमा बस्ने कि बाहिरिने भन्ने निर्णय गर्नुपर्ने समय आएको छ,' मन्त्री लेल्युचेले भनेका थिए । आगामी मे महिनामा बेलायतमा हुने आमनिर्वाचनपछि कन्जर्भेटिभ पार्टी सत्तामा आउने अनुमान गरिएको छ । उक्त पार्टीले आपनो अनुदार युरोप नीतिका कारण आलोचना खेप्दै आएको छ ।
युरोपका थुप्रै समस्याहरू छन्, बढ्दो आप्रवासीको समस्या, उत्पादकत्वमा ह्रास आइरहेको अवस्थामा विद्यमान सामाजिक सुरक्षाको व्यवस्थालाई कायम राख्नु, 'आधुनिकीकरणको जन्मभूमि' को रूपमा आपनो साखलाई बचाइराख्नु आदि । त्यति मात्र होइन, युरोप अब कतातिर जान चाहन्छ भन्ने प्रश्न युरोपको लागि सबैभन्दा ठूलो टाउको दुखाइको विषय बनेको छ । युरोप एउटा विभाजित तथा कमजोर शक्तिको रूपमा रहिरहन चाहन्छ वा एउटा बलियो संघ हुनका लागि युरोपेली समायोजनलाई अझ मजबुत बनाउन चाहन्छ ?
जनमत सर्वेक्षणमा तुहिएको संघको संविधान र भर्खरैको लिस्बन सन्धिले केही संकेत दिएको छ । लिस्बन सन्धिभन्दा अघि प्रस्तावित संघको संविधानलाई डच, पेन्च र आइरिस मतदाताले जनमत सर्वेक्षणमा अस्वीकार गरेका थिए । यसरी संघलाई सञ्चालन गर्ने दस्तावेजलाई संविधानको नाम दिँदा जनताको राय लिनुपर्ने धेरै सदस्य राष्ट्रको बाध्यताले र अनुमोदन नहुने जोखिमले गर्दा सन्धिको रूपमा उक्त संविधानलाई ब्युँताइयो । सन्धिका लागि
भने सदस्य राष्ट्रले संसदीय अनुमोदन मात्र गरे हुन्छ ।
उता युरोपेली संघको एक मुख्य खेलाडी जर्मनी पनि अन्य प्रमुख राष्ट्रजस्तै अन्तरद्वन्द्वमा फसेको छ । जर्मन राजनीतिक सम्भ्रान्त वर्ग बृहत्तर समायोजनको पक्षमा देखिन्छ भने जनमत उक्त विषयमा विभाजित छ । लिस्बन सन्धि अस्वीकृत संविधानकै नयाँ स्वरूप हो र यसले आमजनताको मतको खिल्ली उडाएको छ भन्नेहरूको संख्या बढ्दो छ ।
ईयूको सबभन्दा ठूलो आलोचना 'डेमोक्रेटिक डेफिसिट' -प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा) हो जसको फलस्वरूप ईयूले गर्ने निर्णयमा जनमत प्रतिविम्बित हुँदैन । युरोपेली संघको कार्यपालिका युरोपेली आयोग प्रत्यक्ष निर्वाचित अंग होइन, जसले गर्दा पदमा बसेकाहरू जनताप्रति सोझै उत्तरदायी हुँदैनन् । लिस्बन सन्धिअनुसार युरोपेली संसद् यति बढी शक्तिशाली हुनेछ कि ईयू जस्तो विशाल अन्तरदेशीय संगठनभित्र जति नै टालटुल गरे पनि 'प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा' कम गर्न असम्भव नै हुनेछ ।
राजनीतिक र आर्थिक समायोजनको एउटा उदाहरणीय र अद्वितीय नमुना भए पनि युरोपेली संघ अझै पूर्ण र सर्वगुण सम्पन्न छैन । युरोप महादेशभित्र पनि शंका-उपशंका व्याप्त छन् । सदस्य राष्ट्रको सार्वभौमिकता समाप्त पार्दै एउटा महाशक्ति 'सुपरस्टेट' को उदय हुने कुराप्रति संघमा विश्वास गर्नेहरू पनि सचेत देखिन्छन् ।
गत जुनमा कार्लस्रुहेस्थित जर्मनीको संवैधानिक अदालतले लिस्बन सन्धिले गर्दा ब्रसेल्समा बुझाइएको थुप्रै क्षेत्राधिकार अझै जर्मनीमै रहनेछ भनेर फैसला सुनाएको थियो । सो निर्णयमा संलग्न आठ न्यायाधीशले लिस्बन सन्धि अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सहयोगको लागि गरिएको एउटा संयन्त्र मात्र भएको तर्क गरेका थिए । सो अदालतले जर्मन सरकारलाई सो सन्धि यदि संविधानको रूपमा नै स्वीकार गर्ने हो भने जनमतसंग्रहमार्फत् जनताको राय लिनुपर्ने सुझाव पनि दिएको थियो । तर जनमतसंग्रहमा नजानकै लागि लिस्बन सन्धि बनाइएको थियो, किनकि चेक गणराज्य, डेनमार्क, आयरल्यान्ड, पोल्यान्ड, पोर्चुगल, बेलायत तथा अरू राष्ट्रमा सार्वभौमिकताको विषयमा कुनै पनि निर्णय गर्नुअघि जनमतसंग्रहको प्रावधान छ ।
बाहिरबाट हेर्दा युरोपेली संघ क्षेत्रीय एकता र समायोजनको एउटा राम्रो उदाहरण देखिए पनि सदस्यहरूको विचलन र संघको भावी कार्यदिशाप्रति बढ्दो असन्तुष्टिले उक्त अन्तरदेशीय संरचनाको स्थिरतामाथि प्रश्न उठ्न थालेको छ । युरोपेली संसद्का लागि भएको गत सालको चुनावमा थुप्रै त्यस्ता सांसद पनि निर्वाचित भए जसले पहिले ईयूको खारेजीको पक्षमा नारा उठाएका थिए । राजनीतिज्ञहरूको नाराकै आधारमा ब्रसेल्सको शक्ति घट्दै जाने कल्पना गर्न सकिन्न । तथापि ती सांसदको जितले युरोपेली जनताको ब्रसेल्सप्रतिको असन्तुष्टि र नैराश्यता भने स्पष्ट रूपमा उजागर गरेको छ ।
युरोपेली संघका हर्ताकर्ताले संघका उपलब्धिलाई जनसमक्ष पुर्याउन नसक्नु एउटा ठूलो कमजोरीको रूपमा देखिन्छ । संघको अन्तरदेशीय संरचनाले गर्दा संघलाई ४१ करोड आमजनतासम्म -जो २७ राष्ट्रमा फैलिएका छन्) पुग्न कठिन पार्छ । त्यसमाथि 'प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा' दुईधारे तरबार हो । राजनीतिज्ञलाई यसले जति फाइदा पुर्याउँछ, त्यति नै घाटा
पनि । विश्वव्यापी आर्थिक संकटले ब्रसेल्समाथि समस्या थपेको छ र ईयूका विरोधीलाई थप मौका दिएको छ । केही सदस्य राष्ट्र जस्तै ग्रीस टाट पल्टिने अवस्थामा छन्, जसले गर्दा युरो प्रचलनमा रहेको युरोजोनको विघटनको अड्कलबाजी पनि चलिरहेको छ । ग्रीसलाई उद्धार गरे, आयरल्यान्ड र स्पेनलाई पनि गर्नुपर्ने हुन सक्छ । फलस्वरूप सबै आर्थिक भार जर्मनीको काँधमा आउने देखिन्छ । ईयूसमक्ष अब सङ्घर्ष गरिरहेका सदस्यसँग ऐक्यबद्धता व्यक्त गर्ने वा आर्थिक अनुशासनहीनताको लागि दण्डित गर्ने, दुई मात्र विकल्प छन् । तर जुन विकल्प रोजे पनि ईयूको लागि चुनौती भने कम छैन ।
कान्तिपुर
फाल्गुन १ -
गत साल लन्डनको हिथ्रो विमानस्थलको अध्यागमनमा एक अधिकारीले मलाई केही प्रश्न सोध्ने क्रममा मेरो बेलायत बसाइमा लाग्ने खर्चका बारेमा पनि सोधे । यसको जवाफमा मैले यति खर्च लाग्छ भन्दा 'पाउण्ड' मा नभनी 'युरो' मा भन्न
पुगेछु । सायद यात्राको थकान वा केही महिनाअघिमात्र नेदरल्यान्ड बसेकाले मेरो जिब्रो चिप्लेको हुनसक्छ । तर ती अधिकारीले त्यसलाई गम्भीरतापूर्वक
लिए । उनले भने, 'हामी यहाँ बेलायती पाउन्ड स्टर्लिङ चलाउँछौं र यसमा गर्व पनि गर्छौं ।' मजस्ता तेस्रो देशबाट युरोप प्रवेश गर्ने आगन्तुकले युरोपेली संघ -ईयू) का सदस्य राष्ट्रभरि नै समान नीतिको अपेक्षा गर्नु स्वभाविकै हो । अझ खासगरी नेदरल्यान्ड, जर्मनीजस्ता 'युरोपको मुट' भनिने मुलुकमा केही समय बिताएपछि संघका अन्य राष्ट्रमा पनि त्यस्तै व्यवहारको अपेक्षा हुँदोरहेछ ।
भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी विदेशमन्त्री हेनरी किसिन्जरले विभाजित युरोपप्रति व्यङ्ग्य गर्दै युरोपमा रहँदा मैले कोसँग छलफल गर्नु भन्दै प्रश्न उठाएका थिए । किसिन्जरको प्रश्नलाई उक्त संघका विरोधी एवं समर्थक दुवैथरीले आज पनि युरोपको सवालमा प्रयोग गर्ने
गर्छन् । गत मंसिर १६ गतेदेखि कार्यान्वयनमा आएको लिस्बन सन्धिले दुईवटा पदको सिर्जना गरेर किसिन्जरले उक्त सवाल उठाएको ३६ वर्षपछि जवाफ दिएको छ । यसैबीच संघको प्रथम राष्ट्रपति र विदेश मन्त्रीको निर्वाचन पनि सम्पन्न भइसकेको छ । तर आलंकारिक कार्यकारी पदको सिर्जना गर्दैमा संघको भावी कार्यदिशाप्रतिको विवाद र संरचनागत कमजोरीको पूर्णरूपमा समाधान हुन्छ भन्ने ग्यारेन्टी छैन ।
बेलायतले अहिलेसम्म पनि 'ओप्ट आउट' -कुनै नीतिबाट बाहिरिने व्यवस्था) मार्फत युरो साझा मौदि्रक नीतिजस्ता संघका साझा नीतिबाट आफूलाई टाढा राख्दै आएको छ । त्यसो त डेनमार्क चारवटा 'ओप्ट आउट' मार्फत टाढा बसेको छ । संघका २७ सदस्य राष्ट्रमध्ये त्यस्तै नीति अख्तियार गर्ने सदस्यको सङ्ख्या ६ पुगेको छ । बेलायत तथा अन्य सदस्य राष्ट्रभित्रै पनि 'एकता र समायोजनको हद' र 'सीमा' बारेमा विवाद उठ्दै आएको छ । मूलतः राष्ट्रिय सार्वभौमिकतालाई युरोपेली समायोजनको लागि कुन हदसम्म समर्पण गर्ने भन्ने विवाद हो । तथापि राजनीतिज्ञहरू यस विषयलाई टाढै राख्न चाहन्छन् ।
बेलायतका लेबर र कन्जर्भेटिभ दुवै पार्टीले युरोपेली संविधानको बारेमा जनमतसंग्रह गर्ने वाचा गरेका थिए । तर हाल आएर दुवै पार्टीले आफ्नो अडान परिवर्तन गरेका छन् ।
युरोपेली संघमा भित्री मनदेखि सहभागी नभएको भन्ने आरोप बेलायतले खेप्दै आएको छ । बेलायत आफूलाई अमेरिका तथा अङ्ग्रेजीभाषी राष्ट्रको समूहबाट टाढा राखेको देख्न चाहँदैन । बेलायती दैनिक 'द गार्जियन' का अनुसार केही महिनाअघि युरोपका लागि पेन्च मन्त्री पियरे लेल्युचेले कन्जर्भेटिभ पार्टीलाई 'युरोपमा बेलायतको स्थानलाई अवमूल्यन गरेको' भन्ने कडा टिप्पणी गरेका थिए । 'कसैले पनि संघसँग खेलबाड नगरोस्, अब इमानदार भएर संघमा बस्ने कि बाहिरिने भन्ने निर्णय गर्नुपर्ने समय आएको छ,' मन्त्री लेल्युचेले भनेका थिए । आगामी मे महिनामा बेलायतमा हुने आमनिर्वाचनपछि कन्जर्भेटिभ पार्टी सत्तामा आउने अनुमान गरिएको छ । उक्त पार्टीले आपनो अनुदार युरोप नीतिका कारण आलोचना खेप्दै आएको छ ।
युरोपका थुप्रै समस्याहरू छन्, बढ्दो आप्रवासीको समस्या, उत्पादकत्वमा ह्रास आइरहेको अवस्थामा विद्यमान सामाजिक सुरक्षाको व्यवस्थालाई कायम राख्नु, 'आधुनिकीकरणको जन्मभूमि' को रूपमा आपनो साखलाई बचाइराख्नु आदि । त्यति मात्र होइन, युरोप अब कतातिर जान चाहन्छ भन्ने प्रश्न युरोपको लागि सबैभन्दा ठूलो टाउको दुखाइको विषय बनेको छ । युरोप एउटा विभाजित तथा कमजोर शक्तिको रूपमा रहिरहन चाहन्छ वा एउटा बलियो संघ हुनका लागि युरोपेली समायोजनलाई अझ मजबुत बनाउन चाहन्छ ?
जनमत सर्वेक्षणमा तुहिएको संघको संविधान र भर्खरैको लिस्बन सन्धिले केही संकेत दिएको छ । लिस्बन सन्धिभन्दा अघि प्रस्तावित संघको संविधानलाई डच, पेन्च र आइरिस मतदाताले जनमत सर्वेक्षणमा अस्वीकार गरेका थिए । यसरी संघलाई सञ्चालन गर्ने दस्तावेजलाई संविधानको नाम दिँदा जनताको राय लिनुपर्ने धेरै सदस्य राष्ट्रको बाध्यताले र अनुमोदन नहुने जोखिमले गर्दा सन्धिको रूपमा उक्त संविधानलाई ब्युँताइयो । सन्धिका लागि
भने सदस्य राष्ट्रले संसदीय अनुमोदन मात्र गरे हुन्छ ।
उता युरोपेली संघको एक मुख्य खेलाडी जर्मनी पनि अन्य प्रमुख राष्ट्रजस्तै अन्तरद्वन्द्वमा फसेको छ । जर्मन राजनीतिक सम्भ्रान्त वर्ग बृहत्तर समायोजनको पक्षमा देखिन्छ भने जनमत उक्त विषयमा विभाजित छ । लिस्बन सन्धि अस्वीकृत संविधानकै नयाँ स्वरूप हो र यसले आमजनताको मतको खिल्ली उडाएको छ भन्नेहरूको संख्या बढ्दो छ ।
ईयूको सबभन्दा ठूलो आलोचना 'डेमोक्रेटिक डेफिसिट' -प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा) हो जसको फलस्वरूप ईयूले गर्ने निर्णयमा जनमत प्रतिविम्बित हुँदैन । युरोपेली संघको कार्यपालिका युरोपेली आयोग प्रत्यक्ष निर्वाचित अंग होइन, जसले गर्दा पदमा बसेकाहरू जनताप्रति सोझै उत्तरदायी हुँदैनन् । लिस्बन सन्धिअनुसार युरोपेली संसद् यति बढी शक्तिशाली हुनेछ कि ईयू जस्तो विशाल अन्तरदेशीय संगठनभित्र जति नै टालटुल गरे पनि 'प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा' कम गर्न असम्भव नै हुनेछ ।
राजनीतिक र आर्थिक समायोजनको एउटा उदाहरणीय र अद्वितीय नमुना भए पनि युरोपेली संघ अझै पूर्ण र सर्वगुण सम्पन्न छैन । युरोप महादेशभित्र पनि शंका-उपशंका व्याप्त छन् । सदस्य राष्ट्रको सार्वभौमिकता समाप्त पार्दै एउटा महाशक्ति 'सुपरस्टेट' को उदय हुने कुराप्रति संघमा विश्वास गर्नेहरू पनि सचेत देखिन्छन् ।
गत जुनमा कार्लस्रुहेस्थित जर्मनीको संवैधानिक अदालतले लिस्बन सन्धिले गर्दा ब्रसेल्समा बुझाइएको थुप्रै क्षेत्राधिकार अझै जर्मनीमै रहनेछ भनेर फैसला सुनाएको थियो । सो निर्णयमा संलग्न आठ न्यायाधीशले लिस्बन सन्धि अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सहयोगको लागि गरिएको एउटा संयन्त्र मात्र भएको तर्क गरेका थिए । सो अदालतले जर्मन सरकारलाई सो सन्धि यदि संविधानको रूपमा नै स्वीकार गर्ने हो भने जनमतसंग्रहमार्फत् जनताको राय लिनुपर्ने सुझाव पनि दिएको थियो । तर जनमतसंग्रहमा नजानकै लागि लिस्बन सन्धि बनाइएको थियो, किनकि चेक गणराज्य, डेनमार्क, आयरल्यान्ड, पोल्यान्ड, पोर्चुगल, बेलायत तथा अरू राष्ट्रमा सार्वभौमिकताको विषयमा कुनै पनि निर्णय गर्नुअघि जनमतसंग्रहको प्रावधान छ ।
बाहिरबाट हेर्दा युरोपेली संघ क्षेत्रीय एकता र समायोजनको एउटा राम्रो उदाहरण देखिए पनि सदस्यहरूको विचलन र संघको भावी कार्यदिशाप्रति बढ्दो असन्तुष्टिले उक्त अन्तरदेशीय संरचनाको स्थिरतामाथि प्रश्न उठ्न थालेको छ । युरोपेली संसद्का लागि भएको गत सालको चुनावमा थुप्रै त्यस्ता सांसद पनि निर्वाचित भए जसले पहिले ईयूको खारेजीको पक्षमा नारा उठाएका थिए । राजनीतिज्ञहरूको नाराकै आधारमा ब्रसेल्सको शक्ति घट्दै जाने कल्पना गर्न सकिन्न । तथापि ती सांसदको जितले युरोपेली जनताको ब्रसेल्सप्रतिको असन्तुष्टि र नैराश्यता भने स्पष्ट रूपमा उजागर गरेको छ ।
युरोपेली संघका हर्ताकर्ताले संघका उपलब्धिलाई जनसमक्ष पुर्याउन नसक्नु एउटा ठूलो कमजोरीको रूपमा देखिन्छ । संघको अन्तरदेशीय संरचनाले गर्दा संघलाई ४१ करोड आमजनतासम्म -जो २७ राष्ट्रमा फैलिएका छन्) पुग्न कठिन पार्छ । त्यसमाथि 'प्रजातान्त्रिक घाटा' दुईधारे तरबार हो । राजनीतिज्ञलाई यसले जति फाइदा पुर्याउँछ, त्यति नै घाटा
पनि । विश्वव्यापी आर्थिक संकटले ब्रसेल्समाथि समस्या थपेको छ र ईयूका विरोधीलाई थप मौका दिएको छ । केही सदस्य राष्ट्र जस्तै ग्रीस टाट पल्टिने अवस्थामा छन्, जसले गर्दा युरो प्रचलनमा रहेको युरोजोनको विघटनको अड्कलबाजी पनि चलिरहेको छ । ग्रीसलाई उद्धार गरे, आयरल्यान्ड र स्पेनलाई पनि गर्नुपर्ने हुन सक्छ । फलस्वरूप सबै आर्थिक भार जर्मनीको काँधमा आउने देखिन्छ । ईयूसमक्ष अब सङ्घर्ष गरिरहेका सदस्यसँग ऐक्यबद्धता व्यक्त गर्ने वा आर्थिक अनुशासनहीनताको लागि दण्डित गर्ने, दुई मात्र विकल्प छन् । तर जुन विकल्प रोजे पनि ईयूको लागि चुनौती भने कम छैन ।
Sunday, February 14, 2010
Saturday, February 6, 2010
The Voice of the Nation
The Kathmandu Post on Saturday
A combination of private and public media will nurture democracy and ensure pluralistic vibrancy
FEB 06 -
The Nepali state has been besieged by voices demanding transformation from all directions, but little has been said about the need to transform the archaic state-owned broadcasters and the press to make them more socially-responsible. Politicians have paid lip service to the idea from time to time, but they have never seriously considered it when they have had the power to implement change.
Interestingly, on Jan. 13, the UCPN (Maoists)’s publicity and publication department reportedly decided to establish ‘pro-public daily newspapers and television channels.’ The tendency among the Maoists to characterise anything they fancy as ‘pro-public’ is nothing new. The fact that they have a coherent and well-coordinated media strategy and they seem to regularly review its effectiveness is even less surprising. But if Maoists are such shrewd media operators (which we think they are), why do they fail to understand that editors and journalists do not sit down and conspire to write in favour of or against a group? Journalists simply respond to issues and developments as they come using tools of the trade they know best. However, the Maoists do have a legitimate claim when they allege the media of not being socially inclusive, or representative.
But the answer to their gripe does not lie in launching another Maoist mouthpiece, or another party-funded television channel. The answer lies in a publicly-funded national broadcaster and press. Converting Radio Nepal, Nepal Television, and Gorkhapatra Corporation into an independent institution with a claim to credibility will not only ensure public engagement in the political process, but will also provide an inclusive counter-media narrative to the current media discourse. If the Maoist leadership stops thinking like electioneering politicians for a moment, they have an opportunity here to take an initiative on something whose results will be beneficial to both the state as well as the public—by levelling the playing field.
The media plays and will play a crucial role in how the debate on state restructuring will proceed, which issues are conferred a degree of legitimacy, and which are sidelined and ignored. Only an independent national public service broadcaster may be able to be representative enough in a country with so much diversity. Despite good intentions, private or community-run radio broadcasters may not have the inclination or the wherewithal for a thoroughly-inclusive coverage.
As a country emerging from serious conflict, Nepal is lucky to have a vibrant private media that has played an important role in nurturing a degree of accountability. But private media has its own limitations. It is mainly urban-centric, and often gets constrained by its own political economy. A public service press and broadcaster can bridge that gap. There is no alternative to a professional market-oriented free press, but trends in Europe and the U.S. have shown that it is not without its weaknesses. The media conglomerates failed to critically report on financial institutions and their shenanigans, and to adequately inform the public of what was to come. Similar conduct in the run up to the Iraq war has brought media performance under scrutiny.
As the processes of globalisation intensify, media is also increasingly being driven by the same expansionist logic of capitalism. It is only a matter of time when this tide of expansion strikes our shore. Given the vagaries of global information economy and in the absence of a credible publicly-funded independent national broadcaster, private media alone may not be able to nurture democracy to the fullest.
Social responsibility
The idea of social responsibility in relation to the media was first introduced by the Hutchins Commission (1947) in the U.S. and has subsequently been used by Siebert and others. They have argued that a responsible press should ‘provide a full, truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning, serving as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism, and be a ‘common carrier of public expression, giving a representative picture of the constituent groups in society,’ while ‘presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society.’
Only a combination of a successful public sector along with private media can set the stage for professional journalism with a socially-responsible component. An important sector such as the media cannot entirely be left to the whims and fancies of the market or the incompetence of the state. In the Netherlands, public broadcasting (PBS) is thriving alongside a competitive commercial broadcasting. It has led to the development of a professional free market-oriented press, with a socially-responsible public system, competing and complementing each other for the greater good.
The conversion of state-owned press and broadcasters into an autonomous public system to ensure more dissemination of public interest information in areas where private press or broadcasters have failed is long overdue. Even journalists and editors admit that Nepali private media is urban-centric and ‘parochial’. Many media critics see the proliferation of private media outlets without a commensurate demand from the public as lack of their social responsiveness, which is more the reason for the continuation of state broadcasting as an independent body governed by an independent board that produces content that reflects the demography and geography of the country.
Private media has often been criticised for its excessive coverage of politics with little content diversity. Especially, given the diversity of Nepal, only an independent PBS can cater to needs of both the privileged and the marginalised. For example, Netherlands has a proper public broadcasting system that has been fully able to compete with private commercial media and is still able to retain a big market share.� The result of the competition is often surprising, with private media producing content that normally would be a PBS forte, and vice versa.
The Dutch PBS is financed through a mixture of license fee, contributions from members, and a small amount from advertisement revenues, whereas the BBC runs on license fees. Perhaps a combination of the Dutch and the British system may work well for Nepal. The state broadcasters already have a strong market presence here, and the government will need to do very little to make it work. As C.K. Lal’s informative article published in the Nepali Times pointed out, the state broadcaster dominates the market in non-news programming. That edge can be turned around into a credible strength with editorial independence.
At the end of the day, only a healthy combination of a free market-oriented media and a public system will ensure both the vibrancy of the free market and create instruments of social responsibility and accountability. Clearly, the creation of a public broadcasting service should be central to any vision of an inclusive Nepal.
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